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SCYLLA, CHARYBDIS & ADAM SMITH: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
INTRODUCTION
[T]here is a "tension" between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Although the
relationship of the two Clauses has been the subject of much commentary,
the "tension" is of fairly recent vintage .... The causes of the tension,
it seems to me, are threefold. First, the growth of social welfare legislation
during the latter part of the 20th century has greatly magnified the potential
for conflict between the two Clauses, since such legislation touches the
individual at so many points in his life. Second, the decision by [the
Supreme] Court that the First Amendment was "incorporated" into the
Fourteenth Amendment and thereby made applicable against the States
... similarly multiplied the number of instances in which the "tension"
might arise. The third, and perhaps most important, cause of the tension
is [the Court's] overly expansive interpretation of both Clauses. By broadly
construing both Clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel
between the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal action
must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.
One of the few things on which those analyzing the religion clauses of the
first amendment 2 seem to agree is that the Supreme Court's pronouncements
in this area leave much to be desired.3 In recent years, both commentators
and justices have called into question not only certain elements of the Court's
current modes of analysis, but also the very premises on which current
religion clause jurisprudence rests. The perceived tension between the clauses
and the causes of that tension outlined in then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Thomas v. Review Board have sparked a number of alternate theories
for resolving conflicts between government and religion.
This Comment proposes that the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith's
economic theory might aid the weary traveler between the Scylla and Cha-
rybdis of religion clause jurisprudence. An economic analysis of the religion
clauses would not only offer some explanation and justification for much
of what the Court has done in this area of the law, but would also identify
a class of cases that perhaps deserve reconsideration.4 Toward these ends,
1. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720-21 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1.
3. See, e.g., Tushnet, Reflections of the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 997, 1008 (1986) (no one single concept of purpose
can be employed to analyze all problems under the religion clauses).
4. Cf. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1967) (where field of law is
unclear, legal scholars search for rationalizing set of principles to explain judicial decisions).
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this Comment will examine the role of history in interpreting the religion
clauses, the current state of religion clause doctrine, and various alternative
doctrines. The Comment will then examine the economic analysis of law,
propose an economic model of the religion clauses and apply the model to
reoccurring problems in religion clause jurisprudence.
I. THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. The Role of History in Interpreting the Religion Clauses
Justices of the Supreme Court have remarked on at least one occasion
that history is more important in understanding the relationship between the
religion clauses than in understanding any other portion of the Constitution.,
While the debate over the relationship between government and religion,
which motivated the drafting of the religion clauses, predates the clauses, 6
this portion of the Comment is primarily concerned with the history contem-
porary to the drafting of the religion clauses, an era which still influences
debate over the clauses.
The religion clauses of the first amendment are the product of a coalition
that was generally comprised of two factions. 7 One faction of the coalition,
typified by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, could be called ration-
alists. The rationalists viewed the separation of government and religion
from a more political perspective, tending to emphasize establishment con-
cerns and the protection of government from interference by religion. The
other faction, holding the views of Roger Williams, could be called the
pietists.s The pietists viewed separation from a more ecclesiastical perspective
and desired to protect religion from governmental interference.9
5. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("No
provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history
than the religious clause of the First Amendment."). Justice Rutledge's dissent received four
votes. Indeed, the Everson majority's treatment of history suggests agreement with the dissent's
premise. See id. at 8-17. See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (practices of
first Congress respecting legislative chaplaincy reveal framers' intent); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("[Ajn unbroken practice . . . [concerning tax exemptions for religious
organizations] is not something to be lightly cast aside.").
6. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-13.
7. Adams & Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion
Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REv. 317, 317 n.2 (1988) (sources cited therein). It is equally plausible
to adopt a three-faction analysis that separates Madison from the rationalists, based on
Madison's view that both government and religion were best served by religious pluralism. L.
TRIBE, AMElucAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 816 & n.8 (1978).
8. Roger Williams was "a founder of the Baptist church in North America." L. PFEFFER,
RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 202 (1984). Pietism, as manifested in dissenting
churches, such as the Baptists, was a reaction against what was perceived as stagnant state
religion. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN TH UNITED STATES 26 (1964).
Arguably, however, Williams was not a pure pietist. See Little, Roger Williams and the
Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER
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The differing interests represented by the rationalists and pietists within
the coalition for what many of the framers termed "religious liberty"' 0 still
underlie much of the current debate about the role of history in interpreting
the religion clauses." The renewed interest in history as a guide to interpreting
the religion clauses was accompanied, if not prompted, by the expansions
of governmental power noted by then-Justice Rehnquist in his Thomas
dissent. Interestingly, all three expansions involved the Supreme Court in
one way or another. The first expansion concerns the Court's use of the
incorporation doctrine. 2 The second expansion was the transformation of
the federal government from a laissez-faire government of limited power to
a more activist insurer of public entitlements. This second expansion, typified
by but not limited to President Roosevelt's New Deal, was initially resisted
but ultimately accepted by the Court. 3 A more powerful government in-
creased the chances that some exercise of the police power would conflict
with religious liberty. 4 Third, the Court's tendency to broadly construe the
religion clauses helped ensure that the differing interests underlying them
would edge closer to conflict.' 5
7 (J. Wood ed. 1985). John Locke's views and arguments concerning religious tolerance are
similar, if not an outright derivation, of Williams'. See Little, supra, at 7-11.
9. M. HowE, TH-E GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965). For example, Roger Williams
believed that "worldly corruptions" might consume religion if it were unprotected from
government. Id. Nevertheless, some have argued that Williams was also concerned about the
involvement of religion in governmental affairs. Little, supra note 8, at 15.
10. The term was often used by the framers to describe both establishment and free exercise
concerns. See Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 875, 904 (1986).
11. E.g., M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE
FIRST AmNDMENT (1978). See also R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTOIUCAL
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 16-47 (1982) (Chapter 2: Resurrecting Madison and Jefferson).
12. The incorporation doctrine, under which certain portions of the Bill of Rights are held
binding on the actions of state governments by the operation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, dates back to the nineteenth century. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-41 (1897) (fifth amendment just compensation clause made applicable
to the states by the fourteenth amendment).
13. In the early 20th century, the Court invalidated a number of economic regulations under
the doctrine of substantive due process. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 8-2, at 435. The so-called Lochner era was characterized by a narrow
interpretation of valid legislative ends that could be sought under the police power. Id. § 8-4,
at 438. However, a number of factors caused the Court to abandon heightened scrutiny of
economic regulations and to accord judicial deference toward legislative determinations of the
scope of the police power. Id. § 8-7, at 450. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 487-88 (1955) (upholding economic regulation on any set of possible facts).
14. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part L
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1382-83 (1967).
15. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). This last point is a mere subset
of the trend of the law "to expand itself to the limit of its logic." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).
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A brief examination of the first of these expansions-the Court's use of
the incorporation doctrine-is illustrative of the way in which expanded
governmental power may have triggered a reexamination of the history of
the religion clauses. Initially, the religion clauses, like the rest of the Bill of
Rights, were binding on the federal government alone. 16 Because the religion
clauses were not binding on state governments, the Court in Permoli v. First
Municipality of New Orleans17 upheld the conviction of a priest for violation
of a state statute requiring licensure of churches."
Once the Supreme Court held that the religion clauses were binding on
state governments under the incorporation doctrine, 9 however, the potential
for conflict between the competing interests multiplied. 20 Moreover, this
potential was exacerbated by the Court's interpretation of history. For
example, in early cases that incorporated the establishment clause, the Su-
preme Court articulated a strongly rationalist position that would facially
appear to forbid any connection between religion and government. For
example, in Everson v. Board of Education,2' the Court stated that the
establishment clause "was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State.' ' 22
The degree to which the Court actually adhered to a purely rationalist
position, however, is arguable. One need look no further than Everson to
illustrate this point. After invoking the "wall of separation" metaphor, the
Court held that a school board may constitutionally reimburse parents for
the transportation of children to both public and Catholic schools. 23 The
ironic result prompted Justice Jackson to write that "the undertones of the
opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church
from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to
their commingling in educational matters." '24
Regardless of whether the Court's separationist position was in fact con-
sistent with the Court's actual decision, it is significant to note the Court's
reliance on historical material to justify its position.25
16. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
17. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
18. Id. at 608-11.
19. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947) (incorporation of establishment
clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporation of free exercise
clause). This Comment will now dispense with the formality of noting the incorporation of the
various rights involved in discussing cases later in the Comment.
20. See supra text accompanying note 1.
21. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22. Id. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 8 ("Whether this New Jersey law is one respecting an 'establishment of religion'
requires an understanding of the meaning of that language .... Once again, therefore it is not
inappropriate briefly to review the background and environment of the period in which that
constitutional language was fashioned and adopted.") (footnote omitted). See also id. at 33
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given
content by its generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.").
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In the years that followed, some took the Court to task for emphasizing
the rationalist aspects of the religion clauses while ignoring the historical
influence of the pietists.2 6 This criticism may be partially attributable to the
expansions of governmental power discussed above. The new pietists argued
that the history of the passage of the religion clauses led to the conclusion
that government was merely prevented from establishing a church or pre-
ferring one sect over another.2 7 Although the pietist version of history pointed
up some of the flaws in the purely rationalist position,28 this interpretation
of the religion clauses was criticized by many29 and has not been accepted
by the Court.30
26. E.g., M. HowE, supra note 9, at 5-15 (role of separation of church and state was
developed and supported as much by theologians as by skeptics).
27. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("As
its history abundantly shows ... nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to
be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or
the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.");
R. CORD, supra note 11, at xiv ("[Diocumented public actions of the Framers . . . indicate
that the constitutional doctrine of separation of Church and State . . . meant that no national
religion was to be instituted by the Federal Government; nor was any religion, religious sect,
or religious tradition to be placed in a legally preferred position."); M. MALBIN, supra note
11, at preface (history suggests that "Congress did not mean the establishment clause to require
strict neutrality. . . . [Instead, alid to religion was to be permitted as long as it furthered a
purpose the federal government legitimately could pursue and as long as it did not discriminate
in favor of some sects or against others.").
28. For example, as Justice Rehnquist noted in Jaffree, the "wall of separation" metaphor
originated in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association. "Thomas
Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the
Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter . . . was a short
note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed. ... Jaffree, 472 U.S.
at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 93 (1986) ("The funda-
mental defect of the non-preferential [or new pietest] interpretation is that it results in the
unhistorical contention that the First Amendment augmented a nonexistent congressional power
to legislate in the field of religion."); Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 839, 859 (1986) (new pietest interpretation is defective
in that it necessarily assumes that the mere use of a taxpayer's money to provide aid to religious
activity does not interfere with that taxpayer's liberty).
30. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 52-53 (1985) ("At one time it was thought that this right merely
proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but ... the Court has unambig-
uously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.") (citing Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."));
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) ("IT]his Court has rejected
unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference
of one religion over another."); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat
and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally ...
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs.") (footnote omitted).
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The true role of history in discerning the purpose(s) of the religion clauses,
if it can be discerned at all, may lie somewhere between, or outside the
purely rationalist or pietist arguments. If the debate over history proves
anything, it proves that most assertions made about the history of the religion
clauses are open to debate.3" Moreover, there is the continuing debate about
the role of history in constitutional interpretation generally, a debate which
is sadly beyond the scope of this Comment.32
In sum, while the relevance of history in interpreting the religion clauses
is hotly debated in some quarters, history is less than clear in offering any
definitive answers to specific problems in religion clause jurisprudence. This
point is underscored by the fact that the government of the United States is
in some ways fundamentally different from what many of the framers
envisioned.3 Nevertheless, it might be possible to form a general consensus
about the purpose of the religion clauses. For example, some have stated
that the clauses may be designed to protect individual freedom34 or religious
liberty as understood by many of the framers.3" Neither of these proposed
formulations, however, seems to offer much guidance toward advancing
either purpose.
B. Religion Clause Jurisprudence and the Supreme Court
While some have struggled to find a unitary standard by which claims
under either religion clause could be adjudicated,36 the Supreme Court has
31. Abington, 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[The] historical record is at best
ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to support either side .... ); Kurland, supra
note 29, at 841 (reading the framers' minds and relying on history merely lead to several
possible interpretations).
32. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1989); Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). Professor Powell, however, has made a case for the
proposition that history and the intent of the framers should play a small role in interpreting
the religion clauses. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HAsv. L. REV.
885 (1985). According to Powell's argument, the framers generally intended that the text of
the Constitution be interpreted in accord with the common law tradition of adjudication that
prevailed at the time of the framing. Id. at 903. Thus, the use of "original intent" may in fact
violate original intent. Id. at 948.
33. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
34. Kurland, supra note 29, at 860.
35. See generally Laycock, supra note 10, at 879-94 (discussion of framers' views and actions
regarding passage of religion clauses).
36. E.g., P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962) (strict neutrality theory would
prohibit use of religious classifications by government to assign rights or privileges, duties or
obligations); Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of
Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 948 (1986) (theory focusing on purpose
and coercion); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 35-41 (accom-
modation theory focusing on coercion, interference with religious rights of others, and discrim-
ination between sects). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6, at 828 (allowing protection
under establishment clause for anything "arguably non-religious" and under free exercise clause
for anything "arguably religious").
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been content to set different standards for each clause." The use of different
standards may add to the potential for conflict between the clauses." Yet
the academic urge to abandon the Court's standards may stem as much
from the Court's inconsistent application of those standards as from the
potential for doctrinal conflict.
1. The Establishment Clause
The Court typically addresses establishment clause issues by applying a
three-prong test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 9 Under the Lemon test,
a court may invalidate a governmental act that: (1) has the purpose of
advancing religion; (2) has the primary effect of advancing religion; or (3)
excessively entangles government with religion.4 Violation of any of these
prongs will render the governmental act unconstitutional. 41
a. Purpose
The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether the government action in
question has a secular purpose.42 For example, programs involving aid to
nonpublic, or religious schools are usually held to have a secular purpose.4 3
For example, in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,"4 in which non-public
classrooms were leased by a school district in order to conduct remedial and
optional classes taught by public school teachers, the Court agreed that the
37. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (test with respect to
establishment clause focuses on purpose, effect, and excessive entanglement) with Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (strict scrutiny requires government to show a compelling
interest with no lesser restrictive alternative to burden free exercise).
38. McConnell, supra note 36, at 6. Cf. Adams & Gordon, supra note 7, at 329 (criticizing
Tribe's two-standard theory on grounds that the key term "religion" appears only once in the
clauses, thus suggesting unitary treatment). For an explanation of Tribe's theory, see L. TRIaE,
supra note 7, § 14-6, at 826-33.
39. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
40. Id. at 612-13.
41. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1981).
42. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
Sometimes the focus is whether the purpose is to place a stamp of approval or disapproval on
religion. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 697
n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The opinions of Justices O'Connor and Brennan represent a five
vote majority for this proposition. See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987)
(majority opinion cites Justice O'Connor's formulation of the purpose prong from her con-
currence in Lynch). This formulation of the purpose prong more closely parallels the Court's
formulation of the effect prong of the Lemon test. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying
text.
43. Indeed, the Court rarely strikes down legislation under the purpose prong. See Edwards,
482 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cases cited therein). Nevertheless, aid to religious schools
is usually held unconstitutional on other grounds. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
44. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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purpose of the program was not only secular, but also praiseworthy. 4
Likewise, legislation that exempts religious institutions from general gov-
ernment programs typically is held to have a secular purpose. For example,
in Walz v. Tax Commission,46 a statute granting property tax exemptions
specifically to religious properties, in addition to exemptions for property
used for educational and charitable purposes, was held to have a secular
purpose.47 The Walz Court characterized the purpose of the statute as merely
lifting a property tax burden from private profit institutions.4 1
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock 4 9 however, the Court struck down an
exemption from state sales and use taxes provided to religious publications
dedicated to proselytizing religious belief.50 The Texas Monthly plurality held
that such a limited exemption lacked a secular purpose.5' The plurality
distinguished Walz 52 by pointing out that the tax exemptions in those cases
flowed to a wide variety of organizations, including non-religious groups,
whereas the Texas Monthly exemption was granted exclusively to religious
organizations, thus sending a "'message of endorsement' to slighted members
of the community."53
Further, other statutes that do not exempt religious organizations from
governmental programs are still found to violate the purpose prong. For
example, in Stone v. Graham, 4 the Court held that a law requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments on the walls of public classrooms was
unconstitutional under the establishment clause.55 Although the state courts
below held that the "avowed" purpose of the statute was secular, the Court
held that the mere assertion of a secular purpose is insufficient to save a
statute with a "pre-eminent" religious purpose.5 6
45. Id. at 383 ("As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the
[purpose] test."). See also id. at 382 ("Providing for the education of schoolchildren is surely
a praiseworthy purpose.").
46. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
47. Id. at 672.
48. Id. at 673.
49. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
50. Id. at 894 (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall and Justice
Stevens); id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice O'Connor);
id. at 905 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. at 901. Justice Blackmun's concurrence in the judgment may also imply that the
tax lacked a secular purpose, based upon his interpretation of the tax as being limited to
religious publications, excluding atheistic literature. Id. at 907. Interestingly, Justice Blackmun
neither cites nor refers explicitly to the Lemon analysis in the opinion.
52. Id. at 898-900; see id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
53. Id. at 900 (citing Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
54. 449 U.S. 39 (1981).
55. Id. at 41.
56. Id. Compare with Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ("[T]here
must be a secular legislative purpose.") and with Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2570
(1988) (inquiry is whether the action "is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose")
(citations omitted).
1242 [Vol. 39:1235
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b. Primary Effect
The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether the governmental action
has the primary effect of advancing religion." In Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball,5" the Court struck down two programs in which non-public
classrooms were leased by the school district for the purpose of holding
remedial and optional classes taught by public school teachers.5 9 Noting that
40 of the 41 schools involved in the programs were "pervasively sectarian,
' 60
the Court held that the programs at issue may have had the effect of
impermissibly advancing religion.
61
In the context of permissible exemptions from government programs, a
Court plurality distinguished Walz in Texas Monthly.62 In Walz, the Court
upheld a property tax exemption for religious organizations because the
exemption had the effect of promoting both intellectual pluralism and private
initiatives within a community. 63 In contrast, the Court plurality invalidated
the sales tax exemption in Texas Monthly, in part, because the narrow
exemption went to publications which proselytize, which had the primary
effect of advancing religion. 64
c. Excessive entanglement
The final prong of the Lemon test asks whether the action may cause an
excessive entanglement of government and religion. 61 In assessing the entan-
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
58. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
59. Id. at 397.
60. Actually, this finding is mentioned three times. Id. at 379, 385, 394 n.12. According to
the Court, of the 41 schools receiving funds, 28 were Roman Catholic, seven were Christian
Reformed, three were Lutheran, one was Baptist, and one was Seventh Day Adventist. Id. at
379 n.4. Moreover, the vast majority of the students were members of the denomination
operating the school. Id. at 379 n.3. The schools had policy statements indicating that religion
"permeated" the activities of the school, and parents were required to agree to let their children
be taught in accordance with religious doctrine. Id. at 379.
The term "pervasively sectarian" first appears in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
The definition of this term has been the subject of debate. Compare Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at
2580 & n.16 (requiring proof that not only is a recipient of aid affiliated with a religious
institution or that it is "religiously inspired," but also that the aid has been used to fund
"specifically religious activitfies] in an otherwise substantially secular setting") with id. at 2582
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing lack of confidence in concept) and with id. at 2585
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (phrase is a "vaguely defined term of art").
61. The Court found three ways in which the programs might advance religion. The programs
might: involve secular teachers in sectarian teaching; create a symbolic link between government
and religion that could be perceived by school children; and might provide a subsidy to the
religious mission of the sectarian schools. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
62. 109 S. Ct. 890, 898 (1989).
63. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 688-89 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. See 109 S. Ct. at 899-900.
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)).
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glement, the Court may consider: the character and purpose of the recipient,
the type of aid being given, and the nature of the relationship between the
government and the religious group. 66 For example, in Aguilar v. Felton,67
the Court was faced with a New York City program similar to the programs
struck down in Ball.6s Both cases involved the use of publicly funded and
controlled instructors, as well as publicly funded materials and supplies for
classes of private school students. 69 Also, the vast majority of participating
schools were religiously affiliated in both cases. 70 In contrast to Ball, however,
the New York plan required field personnel to oversee classes conducted
under the program." Such supervision was intended to ensure that the classes
did not have religious content.72 Yet the Court struck down the program on
the ground of excessive entanglement because it required government agents
to work with sectarian school officials in determining schedules and student
needs."
Entanglement was another ground on which the Court distinguished Walz
in Texas Monthly.74 The Walz Court had found that a property tax exemption
served further to separate rather than entangle religion.75 In contrast, the
Texas Monthly Court held that the sales tax exemption for magazines which
proselytize might embroil state officials in evaluating the religious content
of the publications. 76
As the forgoing discussion might indicate, the development of this three-
prong test has not provided easily understood rules to guide the behavior of
either governmental or religious institutions. For example, within the paro-
chial school aid context, it may be difficult for those not versed in the arcana
of religion clause jurisprudence to discern the difference between busing a
student to a parochial school, which is constitutional, 7  and busing a parochial
school student on a field trip, Which is unconstitutional. 7 Likewise, the
66. Id. at 615.
67. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
68. Id. at 409.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 406-07.
72. Id. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, in 19 years there has never been a single
incident in which a Title I instructor 'subtly or overtly' attempted to 'indoctrinate the students
in particular religious tenets at public expense."') (quoting Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985)).
73. Id. at 413. This is perhaps one of the sharpest examples of what is referred to by then-
Justice Rehnquist as the "Catch-22" argument. Id. at 420-21 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 109-10 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Aguilar and Ball were decided on the same
day. The programs in Ball were struck down for their possible effects, but the attempt to
disprove those same possible effects doomed the programs in Aguilar.
74. 109 S. Ct. 890, 898 n.2, 902 n.9 (1989).
75. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) ("It restricts the fiscal relationship
between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation
insulating each from the other.").
76. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 902.
77. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
78. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977). Moreover, the government may lend
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decision in Texas Monthly produced four separate opinions, 79 including a
sharp dissent from Justice Scalia, who maintained that Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion misreads Walz. s0
The level of frustration with the Lemon test on the Court has been evident.
The Court has been willing to modify the purpose prong, looking at whether
there has been a purpose to endorse religion, primarily as a response to
concerns raised by Justice O'Connor. s" Nevertheless, Justice Scalia has on
at least one occasion questioned the utility of the purpose prong of the
Lemon test.12 Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist recently has not only criticized
the entanglement prong of the test, 3 but has also argued for abandoning
the test in its entirety.84
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in some of its majority
opinions tend to cast doubt on the continuing vitality of the Lemon test. 5
There are cases where the Court has implied that the test is not necessarily
78. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977). Moreover, the government may lend
a parochial school student a science book, but not a science kit. Id. at 248-51. For a cavalcade
of other examples of fine distinctions in the establishment clause context see Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and Garvey, Another Way of Looking
at School Aid, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 61, 66-67.
79. 109 S. Ct. 890, 894 (1989) (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 905 (opinion of White, J.);
id. at 905 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 907 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
Interestingly, Justice White chose not to address the religion clause issues, concurring instead
on the grounds that the tax exemption for periodicals which are solely devoted to proselytization
of a religious faith was unconstitutionally content-based discrimination under the freedom of
the press guaranteed by the first amendment. Id. at 905 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Compare with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 288-89 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (university
may exclude religious groups from a public forum under the free speech clause of the first
amendment).
80. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 911 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia not only
maintained that Justice Brennan's analysis was "not a plausible reading" of Walz, but also
argued that the Walz Court "explicitly and categorically disavowed reliance upon" Brennan's
arguments. Id. (emphasis in original).
81. E.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
82. Id. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2578 (1988).
84. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly empha-
sized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.");
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) ("[T]he wall of separation that must be maintained
between church and state 'is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship."') (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971)); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971) ("Every analysis must begin with
the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to
measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present."); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("This is not to suggest, however, that we are to engage in a legalistic
minuet in which precise rules and forms must govern.").
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dispositive86 or where the Court has "watered-down" the test in application., 7
For example, the case of Lynch v. Donnelly,"9 in which the Court held that
a city may sponsor a creche without violating the establishment clause, was
criticized for applying a weakened version of the Lemon test. 9 There is at
least one recent case where the Court did not even purport to use the test
and instead looked to history for guidance,9
2. The Free Exercise Clause
The Court's current mode of free exercise analysis employs a form of
strict scrutiny that requires government to show a compelling state interest
to outweigh burdens placed on a person's individual beliefs. 9 Moreover, the
86. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (Lemon test provides "no more than [a]
helpful signpos[t].").
87. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
88. Id.
89. E.g., id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's less-than-vigorous application
of the Lemon test suggests that its commitment to those standards may only be superficial.");
id. at 726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Lemon "compels an affirmance here") (emphasis in
original); Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 784 (Lynch fits within Lemon "[iln an
artless sense-but in no sense that will withstand even the mildest scrutiny").
The Court recently revisited the creche issue in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct.
3086 (1989), but the Court's five-opinion, "can't tell where the Justices are without a scorecard"
product does not clear up this issue any further. See Grady, Yuletide: A Season for Lights and
Lawsuits, Chicago Trib., Nov. 24, 1989, at 1, col. 2. (quoting Professor McConnell as stating
that it is "extremely probable that there will be more litigation than ever before").
90. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983) (upholding legislative chaplaincy). Ar-
guably, Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982), in which the Court employed strict scrutiny
to strike down a statute which discriminated between sects, also falls into this category. See
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. However, the Larson Court did decide that the statute would also fail
the Lemon test, Larson, 456 U.S. at 251-55.
91. "[Alny incidental burden on the free exercise of . .. religion may be justified by a
'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power
to regulate , , . ."' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S, 398, 403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v, Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)), Burdens on religious freedom were not always so judicially disfavored.
Initially, the Supreme Court allowed religious acts, as distinct from religious beliefs, to be
regulated in order to pursue secular goals. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
However, the belief-action dichotomy was eventually eroded by moving from a secular justi-
fication standard to a standard that focused on the burden placed on free exercise rights by
government action. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U,S, 599 (1961). For a discussion of Braunfeld,
see infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. See generally Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HAav. L. REv. 933, 937-42 (1989)
(development of the burden concept).
While this Comment was in the editing pipeline, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that
the Sherbert balancing test would not be applied in cases involving facially neutral statutes
which have an impact on religious conduct, Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 58 U.S.L.W. 4433, 4437 (1990).
In Smith, the Court held that a state can outlaw use of hallucinogenic peyote, even sacramental
use by members of the Native American Church. The Court noted that the Sherbert test had
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government may be required to show that there is no less restrictive alter-
native to its course of action. 9 The result has been a rather robust protection
of religious belief and activity.
In Sherbert v. Verner, Mrs. Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was fired
from her job at a textile mill because she refused to work on Saturday, her
Sabbath.93 She was unable to accept other jobs for the same reason and
applied for unemployment benefits, which were denied. 9 The Court held
that a religious believer should not be forced to choose between observing
the Sabbath and having a job, and therefore Mrs. Sherbert was entitled to
an exemption from the unemployment benefits statute which denied payment
to those who refused "suitable work." 95
Likewise, in Wisconsin v, Yoder,9 Old Order Amish parents challenged
fines levied against them after they removed their children from school after
the eighth grade, in violation of Wisconsin's compulsory education law. 97
The parents argued that mandatory secondary public schooling was contrary
to the Amish belief that separation from the secular world is necessary for
salvation. 9 Although the state argued that children who later leave the Amish
community would be unprepared for life in the secular world, the Court
rejected this argument, stating that there was no evidence of former Amish
burdening society because of their educational shortcomings." Consequently,
the Old Order Amish were entitled to an exemption from the statute.' °°
Nevertheless, like the establishment clause cases, some of the Court's more
recent decisions tend to cast doubt on the level of scrutiny afforded free
always been met outside the unemployment benefits context. Id. at 4436. Consequently, the
Court held the test inapplicable to across-the-board criminal prohibitions of a certain form of
conduct. Id. at 4437. Cases where the free exercise claim prevailed over a general law, such as
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), were distinguished as involving a free exercise claim
plus some other important right. Id. The Smith Court distinguished Yoder as involving the
right of parents protected by substantive due process. See Smith, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4436.
This most recent decision, while essentially reversing the view of the caselaw presented in
this portion of the Comment, actually confirms the discussion of the erosion of free exercise
doctrine, infra notes 101-28 and accompanying text, as well as the search for alternate theories
such as free speech to aid free exercise claims, infra 129-33 and accompanying text, described
in this portion of the Comment.
92. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
93. Id. at 399.
94. Id. at 399-401.
95. Id. at 410, The Court noted that a similar exemption already existed in the statutory
scheme for Sunday worshipers in times of "national emergency." Id. at 406.
96. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
97. Id. at 207-08.
98. Id. at 209.
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id. at 234-36. The Court found that "the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels [the
Amish], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental
tenets of their religious beliefs." Id. at 218 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605
(1961)). The "fundamental tenet" that guaranteed the Amish the right to withdraw their
children from compulsory education was their "literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction
from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 'be not conformed to this world."' Id. at 216.
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exercise claims.°10 The Court has not only found more governmental interests
compelling, but has also been more willing to accept indirect governmental
burdens placed on individual free exercise rights.
In at least two cases involving the federal tax system, the Court has found
governmental interests sufficiently compelling to override an individual's free
exercise interest. In United States v. Lee, 10 2 an Old Order Amish employer
and his Amish employees argued that they were entitled to an exemption
from social security taxes because their religion required them to support
the needy and aged members of their community.103 The Court held that
maintenance of the federal tax base was a compelling interest that justified
taxation of the Amish.1c 4 Consequently, the Old Order Amish employees
were not entitled to an exemption from social security taxes.105
101. Choper, supra note 36, at 951 ("[Tlhe Burger Court has interpreted the free exercise
clause generously. This largess always has had limits, however, and recent evidence suggests
that the Burger Court's benevolence may be substantially spent.").
102. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
103. Id. at 255.
104. Id. at 258. Facially, Lee would appear to be in tension with Yoder because "precisely
the same religious interest is implicated in both cases, and Wisconsin's interest in requiring its
children to attend school until the age of 16 is surely not inferior to the federal interest in
collecting these social security taxes." Id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Nevertheless, the Lee majority attempted to justify its decision by invoking a "slippery slope"
argument premised on the idea that social security taxes are analogous to general income taxes.
The Court argued that if "a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage
of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals
would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income
tax." Id. at 260.
However, as Justice Stevens points out, "[t]he Court overstates the magnitude of this risk
because the Amish claim applies only to a small religious community with an established welfare
system of its own." Id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Moreover, the claim
in Lee is distinguishable from the hypothetical case involving national defense because the
insurance provided by social security could be obtained privately by the Amish, whereas inter-
continental ballistic missiles and the like are public goods. See Epstein, Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4, 88-89 (1988).
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens concurred with the other eight justices because of "the difficulties
associated with processing other claims to tax exemption on religious grounds." Lee, 455 U.S.
at 263 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens' objection
does not rest upon the difficulty of exempting religious believers from a general program;
rather, "lilt is the overriding interest in keeping the government-whether it be the legislature
or the courts-out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims."
Id. at 263 n.2. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). The risk is that disparate treatment
of religious claims may raise the perception that the establishment clause is being violated. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). However, the adoption of a general rule that religious
exemptions to general programs will not be granted by the Court would not necessarily eliminate
that perceptual problem, because such a rule avoids passing judgment on the relative merits of
religious claims by suggesting that religious claims have little or no merit.
105. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. "The tax imposed on employers to support the social security
system must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise."
Id. (footnote omitted). Congress had already granted an exemption to self-employed Amish.
Id. at 260.
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The following term, in Bob Jones University v. United States,'06 the Court
unanimously held that the elimination of racial discrimination was a com-
pelling governmental interest.' °7 In Bob Jones, several private, religiously-
inspired schools with racially discriminatory policies challenged the Internal
Revenue Service's decision to deny the schools their tax-exempt status.108
The schools defended their policies as being based upon certain religious
beliefs. The Court not only agreed that ending racial discrimination was a
compelling interest, but also agreed that there were no less restrictive means
of achieving that goal than denying tax exempt status to the schools; thus,
the Court upheld the Service's decision.' °9
Other cases indicate that the Court is likely to find military interests
sufficiently compelling to justify governmental impingement on an indivi-
dual's free exercise interests." 0 The Court first suggested this possibility in
an establishment clause case."' Subsequently, in Goldman v. Weinberger,"'2
an Air Force officer challenged a regulation which prohibited the wearing
of headgear indoors." 3 The Court carved out an exception to the strict
scrutiny standard for military affairs, deferring instead to the judgment of
military professionals." 4 Consequently, the Court upheld the regulation." 5
106. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
107. Id. at 604. ("[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
racial discrimination in education-discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the
first 165 years of this Nation's constitutional history. That governmental interest substantially
outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious
beliefs.") (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 581. The change in the Service's policy followed litigation that enjoined it from
approving tax-exempt status to any school in Mississippi that maintained a policy of discrimi-
nation. Id. at 578-79.
109. Id. at 604-05.
110. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Ill. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 461 n.23 (1971) (dictum) (citing Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S.
245, 264 (1934)). See also Welsh, 398 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court has
more than once stated its unwillingness to construe the First Amendment, standing alone, as
requiring draft exemptions for religious believers."). In Gillette, petitioners sought to be
exempted from the Selective Service Draft due to their opposition to the Vietnam War. The
legislation contained a statutory exemption from conscription for those opposed to all war for
religious reasons. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 439-40.
112. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
113. Id. at 505-06. Petitioner, an ordained rabbi in addition to a commissioned officer in
the United States Air Force, argued that the military regulation which barred him from wearing
a yarmulke violated his first amendment free exercise rights. Id.
114. "Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."
Id. at 507. See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (enlisted personnel may not
sue superior officers for damages arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights because
"[c]ivilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the
court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their
superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the
Military Establishment."); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (Air Force regulations
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Recent cases also suggest that the Court has been more willing to accept
indirect governmental burdens placed on individual free exercise rights. In a
case predating the Sherbert Court's announcement of a strict scrutiny stan-
dard, Braunfeld v. Brown, 116 the Court held that a law requiring that certain
types of stores be closed on Sundays did not violate an Orthodox Jewish
merchant's free exercise rights." 7 Braunfeld argued that to follow both the
law and his religious beliefs required him to close his store on both Sunday
and Saturday, which not only imposed an economic burden on him, but
also deterred people from becoming Orthodox Jews."' The Braunfeld Court
reasoned that the merchant's economic burden was outweighed by the state's
interest in a uniform day of rest and in avoiding potential administrative
burdens and the potential windfall to the merchant that might result from
an exemption.119
In the post-Sherbert era, Braunfeld may have been of dubious precedential
value.120 However, two more recent cases suggest that indirect burdens on
free exercise, such as the economic burden in Braunfeld, may still be accepted
by the Court. For example, in Bowen v. Roy,' 2' the Supreme Court held
requiring approval prior to on-base circulation of petitions to Congress are valid); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976) (upholding Army regulations banning partisan political
speech on base and requiring prior approval of literature to be distributed on base). For
examples of deference to the military in other contexts, see Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738, 757-58 (1975) (court-martial charges for selling drugs while off-duty were not within
equitable jurisdiction of civilian court); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (physician
who refused to admit or deny membership in Communist Party and thus assigned as Army
laboratory technician not entitled to commissioned rank or discharge).
Two seminal cases which demonstrate the lengths to which the Court has gone in deferring
to military interests are Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew on
all persons of Japanese ancestry as a valid exercise of the war power of Congress and President),
and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding exclusion of all persons of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area). Korematsu is important as one of the first
cases to announce that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216. Compare
with Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101 ("Our investigation here does not go beyond the inquiry
whether, in the light of all the relevant circumstances preceding and attending their promulgation,
the challenged orders and statute afforded a reasonable basis for the action taken in imposing
the curfew.") (emphasis added). Korematsu thus establishes not only that racial classifications
will be subject to strict scrutiny, but also that military interests may override strict scrutiny.
115. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510.
116. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 603-07. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-53 (1961), established the
constitutionality of Sunday Closing Laws or Sunday Blue Laws.
118. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602.
119. Id. at 608-09. The Court suggested, however, that the state legislature might well provide
an exemption for religious believers. Id. at 608.
120. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("As to
the proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, I would accept the decision of Braunfeld
* and the dissent in Sherbert").
121. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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that a Native American dependent may be assigned and forced to provide a
social security number for the purpose of receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children benefits.1 2 2 Roy had refused to allow his child to be
assigned a social security number because he believed that the use of a such
a number might impair his child's soul.1 23 Analogous to Braunfeld, the Roy
Court reasoned that the potential administrative costs to the government of
granting religious exemptions outweighed the infringement of the individual's
free exercise rights.1
24
The same doctrine was applied in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 25 in which the Court held that government could
build a logging road through sacred burial sites on government-owned land
without showing a compelling interest. 26 Although the Court noted the
potential destruction of Indian religious exercise that might result from
construction of the road, 2 7 the Court followed Roy, holding that the gov-
ernment action was valid because it neither coerced the Indians into violating
their beliefs nor penalized the Indians' religious practice through the denial
of privileges accorded other citizens.' 21
The weakening of free exercise doctrine may have prompted litigants to
seek other vehicles for the advancement of religious interests. For example,
in Widmar v. Vincent,2 9 the Court held that a public university's policy
122. Id. at 712.
123. Id. at 697. At trial, Roy had initially focused on the evil caused simply by obtaining a
social security number. The government then argued that the case was moot, because the
number had already been issued. Roy later testified that it was the use of the number, which
had not yet occurred, that would cause his daughter's spirit to be robbed. Id. See also Roy v.
Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 605 (M.D. Penn. 1984) (finding of fact 33).
124. Roy, 476 U.S. at 709-12. See also id. at 730 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[A]lithough prevention of welfare fraud is concededly a compelling interest,
the Government asserts only administrative efficiency as its reason for refusing to exempt
appellees from furnishing the Social Security number."). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, distinguished the facts of Roy. In Roy, the government already had the
necessary information to issue a social security number and merely used the number for internal
government processing. Id. at 726-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thus, these three justices dissented from the case insofar as plaintiff would be required to
provide a social security number to obtain benefits.
125. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
126. Id. at 1333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court does not for a moment suggest that
the interests served by the G-0 road are in any way compelling.").
127. Id. at 1326. "The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that
the logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on
traditional Indian religious practices." Id.
128. Id. at 1325. In support of this rationale, the Court seemingly moves toward a far more
literal interpretation of the free exercise clause. Id. at 1326 ("It is true that this Court has
repeatedly held that indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just
outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. . . . [But t]he crucial
word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit."').
129. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). See also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981) (solicitation by members of religious group may be subjected to
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excluding religious groups from using university facilities for meetings was
unconstitutional under the free speech clause. 30 The Court rejected the
university's argument that allowing access to religious groups would violate
the establishment clause. 3 ' Instead, the Court viewed the university facilities
as a "public forum"' 3 2 and the policy as an unconstitutional content-based
restriction on speech.' 33
Thus, like the trend in recent establishment clause cases, 3 4 there seems to
be a gap between the Court's free exercise doctrine and its actual decisions. 3
That the Court appears more willing to accept the assertion that a govern-
mental interest is compelling or that a burden on free exercise is merely
indirect demonstrates the point. That parties may turn to other provisions
of the Constitution to protect religious interests underscores the point.
Therefore, it is not surprising that some have looked for other principles to
explain the Court's results.
C. Alternate Theories
This section will discuss three of the most prominent theories advanced
by scholars in the attempt to provide a coherent method of addressing the
religion clauses. It is interesting to note the way in which these theories
parallel the different approaches employed by the Court in the postwar era,
as well as the different views of the various framers.
1. Strict Separation
The strict separation theory reflects the view taken early in the postwar
era in cases such as Everson v. Board of Education. 36 Strict separation of
same time, place, and manner restrictions as political, social, and charitable groups). Compare
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593-96 (1940) (rejecting free exercise challenge
of compulsory flag-salute in public schools) with West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (overruling Minersville and holding compulsory flag-salute in public school
violates first amendment rights to speech and association).
130. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. In Widmar, student members of a religious group argued
that a university regulation that prohibited the use of university facilities for religious purposes
violated, in part, their freedom of speech. Id. at 265-66.
131. Id. at 270-75.
132. Id. at 274-77. The Court had previously recognized state universities, or at least portions
thereof, to be public forums for university students. E.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
Cf. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (sidewalk adjacent to high
school recognized as public forum).
133. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. The university failed to show a compelling state interest
met by a narrowly drawn regulation. See id. at 270 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461,
464-65 (1980)).
134. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
135. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM.
& MARY L. Rav. 985, 994 (1986) (Court's free exercise analysis is form of intermediate scrutiny
at most).
136. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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government and religion would forbid both direct and indirect aid to religion.
Although invocation of the "wall of separation" between government and
religion may have a certain symbolic value to the ordinary observer, this
theory is subject to several lines of criticism.
First, strict separation is vulnerable to the extent that it relies on the purely
rationalist version of history advanced by the Everson Court.'17 Second,
application of strict separation produces results that would often appear to
be hostile to religion and religious liberty. For example, if strict separation
were adopted by the Court, it is possible that religious institutions could be
denied access to water and sewer services, as well as fire and police pro-
tection. 3 ' Moreover, even if religion and government were amenable to this
degree of separation, there might be those who would be suspicious of a
sectarian police force outside government control. Taking the argument to
its logical extreme reveals the impracticability of the doctrine; under the
strict separation theory, the armed forces of the United States would be
forced to segregate their protection of religious and secular institutions within
the nation's borders from attack, nuclear and otherwise.
2. Strict Neutrality
A second approach to the religion clauses revolves around the concept of
neutrality. Strict neutrality theory,'3 9 commonly associated with Professor
Kurland, would read the religion clauses as forbidding the government's use
of religious classifications in the imposition of societal benefits and bur-
dens.140 Although the Court has periodically embraced the general concept
of neutrality,14 1 even Professor Kurland has acknowledged that the Court
has not embraced strict neutrality. 142
Like strict separation, strict neutrality has been subject to various lines of
criticism. First, the prohibition of religious classifications may be contrary
137. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
138. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
139. The scope of this portion of the Comment is limited to a discussion of strict, or formal,
neutrality. For a discussion of alternative conceptions of neutrality, see Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. Rav. 993 (1990).
140. P. KURLAND, supra note 36, at 18. For a general discussion of Professor Kurland's
view, see Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961).
141. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) ("No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions. ") (quoting
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality."); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)
(government cannot pass laws that aid all religions against nonbelievers or prefer a religion
over another); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (first amendment "requires
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers").
142. See Kurland, Foreword-Church and State in the United States: A New Era of Good
Feelings, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 215, 215-16 (discussion of Court's move toward accommodation
theory).
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to the clauses themselves, which refer to religion. 14 Second, strict neutrality
does not address problems involving facially neutral laws that have a dis-
parate impact on religion.' 44 The gradual transformation of the federal
government from an insurer of negative rights against government to an
insurer of positive rights in the form of entitlements and benefits makes
strict neutrality less attractive to those who wish to protect both establishment
and free exercise values. 14
3. Accommodation
A third theory, reflecting a Madisonian concern with religious pluralism,
has been advanced to protect religious liberty, primarily free exercise values.
Accommodation theory, which would permit government to single out relig-
ion for relief from burdens on free exercise, traces its roots to Zorach v.
Clauson. 146 In Zorach, the Court upheld a program which released public
school children from class for off-premises religious instruction. 47 Accom-
modation may also underlie a series of more recent cases upholding various
statutory exemptions for religious institutions. 14
There are several versions of accommodation theory, one of which permits
the removal of only governmentally imposed burdens on free exercise rights. 49
Another prevalent version of accommodation theory, advanced by Professor
McConnell, would extend to both publicly and privately imposed burdens
143. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
144. For example, the statutes at issue in Yoder and Braunfeld were both facially neutral.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance law required all children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600 (1961) (Pennsylvania criminal statute required all
merchants to close certain retail stores on Sunday). Another way of stating the same argument
is to ask whether government inaction, for example, the failure to exempt religion in a statute,
should be considered either neutral or hostile to religion. For stark examples of the logical
consequences of strict neutrality, see Laycock, supra note 139, at 1000 nn.24-28 and accom-
panying text.
145. See Giannella, supra note 14, at 1388-90.
146. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
147. Id. at 314-15. Compare with McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948)
(striking down similar program for on-premises instruction).
148. E.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (upholding exemption from anti-discrimination statute);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding exemption from property taxes). But
see Ansonia Board of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (upholding employer's
policy limiting paid leave for religious holidays to three days per year); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (striking down statute giving workers absolute right
not to work on their Sabbath); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)
(anti-discrimination statute does not require employer to bear more than a de minimis burden
in accommodating religious beliefs of their employees).
149. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Adams & Gordon, supra note 7, at 321; Note, Permissible Accommodations of Religion:
Reconsidering the New York Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147, 1156-58 (1987).
1254 [Vol. 39:1235
INVISIBLE HAND OF BELIEF
on free exercise.15 0 Professor McConnell proposes a three-prong test to
determine when government should accommodate religion.", The first prong
asks whether the proposed accommodation of religion acts as an inducement
or coercion of belief.' The second prong asks whether the proposed accom-
modation interferes with the religious rights of others.' The third prong
asks whether the accommodation would prefer one sect over another. 5 4
As with the previous two theories, accommodation is open to criticism.
One line of criticism is that Professor McConnell's approach is too broad,
addressing societal burdens on free exercise in addition to governmental
burdens.' Essentially, the argument is that Professor McConnell's theory
is based on a false analogy. The "free exercise values" which he seeks to
protect are not analogous to "equal protection values" that justify legal
prohibitions on private discrimination. While the free exercise clause is
limited by the establishment clause, the equal protection clause has no such
limitation. 156
Second, either form of accommodation theory may weaken the free ex-
ercise clause as well as the establishment clause.'7 Accommodation theory
is based on the premise that as government has expanded, it has placed
burdens on government unforseen at the time of the framing of the Consti-
tution; thus, government should be able to balance these burdens through
statutory exemptions. The inference may be that two wrongs make a right-
placing burdens on everyone, including religious believers, is permissible, so
singling out religion for relief from burdens shared by all is also permissible.
II. ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW
This Comment proposes that a theory of the religion clauses based on
economic analysis would not only provide a coherent basis for decision, but
150. McConnell, supra note 36, at 30-34.
151. Id. at 35-41.
152. Id. at 35-37.
153. Id. at 37-39.
154. Id. at 39-41.
155. Adams & Gordon, supra note 7, at 336 n.98.
156. Id. The difficulties inherent in extending Professor McConnell's theory into the private
sector can be shown with an example. The case of Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985), in which the Court struck down a statute that would have compelled
private employers to give Sabbatarians their Sabbath off, would have been constitutional under
Professor McConnell's approach. McConnell, supra note 36, at 51. Professor McConnell
concludes that the statute did not discriminate among sects because "[a] Sabbath is common
to all the major religions of the country-Christianity, Judaism, Islam." Id. at 55. Ironically,
Professor McConnell himself states that "most accommodations are of value only to members
of minority religions." Id. However, Professor McConnell appears to be referring to the devout
minority of majority religious sects. Id. However, it seems odd to argue that a statute does not
discriminate among sects by reference to majority religions, while ignoring minority religions
which do not share a Sabbatarian belief. The statute may be designed to promote equality or
neutral treatment of different religions, but the statutory means in Caldor are not neutral.
157. Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and the Future of Church and State, 35 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 4 (1985).
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would also avoid many of the problems raised about the competing theories
discussed previously. This portion of the Comment will first discuss the
economic analysis of law in general, defining the terms to be used throughout
the remainder of the discussion. Second, this portion will examine the possible
moral and ethical bases for a jurisprudence grounded in economic analysis.
A. General Concepts of Economic Analysis
"Economics" must be defined before the concept of economic analysis
can be examined. Economics is typically defined as the science which studies
the way humans allocate scarce resources.'58 Economics is more than the
mere study of money.'59 Rather, economics is generally employed in the
attempt to maximize value, which may be defined as the aggregate consumer
willingness to give up other valued goods or services.l 6w
Economists call outcomes that maximize value "efficient."' 6' Economists
look at different types of efficiency. For example, an outcome that leaves
some parties better off and no parties worse off than they were previously
would be "Pareto-superior" efficiency. 62 Pareto-superior efficiency is tied
to the "willingness to pay" component of value; it is concerned with
voluntary transactions. 63
The legal system, however, may be unable to provide Pareto-superior
outcomes for two reasons. First, litigation often results in involuntary trans-
fers of wealth and/or value.16' Second, a judicial remedy may not leave the
parties in a position where all parties may gain from the decision. 65
For example, if a landowner would pay $100,000 to be free of a height
restriction on building construction, and the landowner's neighbors would
insist on only $20,000 in compensation, one would expect the parties to
negotiate for a price between those two figures. This would be the Pareto-
superior result. However, if the dispute were litigated and a court invalidated
the height restriction, the landowner may not be forced to compensate the
158. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 3 (3d ed. 1986).
159. Id. § 1.1, at 6.
160. Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 268 (1986). Posner defines value as
"how much someone is willing to pay for [something] or, if he has it already, how much
money he demands to part with it." R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 1.2, at 11. Johnsen's
formulation is theoretically more accurate because it takes into account lost opportunity costs.
For example, both money and time spent in obtaining an item are components of value.
Johnsen, supra, at 268. However, Posner's definition is more easily measured. R. POSNER,
supra note 158, § 1.2, at 15 (wealth is measured by what people would pay for things instead
of by what they do pay).
161. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 1.1, at 9.
162. See Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment
Spells, 99 YALE L. REV. 549 (1989) (Pareto-efficient).
163. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 64 (1981).
164. Id. This is often the very essence of the judicial function; if a party can get compensation
for another's wrongdoing, there would be no need for the first party to sue.
165. Id. at 64.
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neighbors. Under this second scenario, the landowner gains $100,000 and
the neighbors lose $20,000. This would be a "Kaldor-Hicks" efficient out-
come, which is defined as a result in which the "winning" parties gain more
than "losing" parties stand to lose.'66 Consequently, economic analysis of
law typically examines the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of a decision. 167
Efficiency can also be viewed in terms of distribution and productivity. 16
Distributional efficiency describes a world where goods and services are
distributed to those who value them most. 69 Distributional efficiency is
important because those who value something the most are in the best
position to compensate the producers of that commodity. 70 Productive
efficiency describes a world where the stock of goods and services increases.171
Productive efficiency is important because it is productivity that raises the
overall standard of living in the long run.
A classic case used to illustrate economic concepts is based on the facts
of Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc.,172 which in-
volved two competing hotels along the Florida coastline. The owners of the
Fontainebleau wanted to build a 14 story addition to their hotel. '7 The
owners of the Eden Roc Hotel sought to enjoin construction, claiming that
the shadow cast by the addition during the winter would shade the Eden
Roc's cabana, swimming pool and sunbathing area. 74 Traditional intuitive
legal analysis suggests that Fontainebleau's construction of its addition would
cause harm to the Eden Roc; thus, the issue focuses on whether there is a
remedy for this harm.
Economic analysis, however, introduces the concept of joint causality.' 75
For example, instead of concluding that the Fontainebleau would harm the
Eden Roc, one could argue that enjoining construction allows the owners
of the Eden Roc to cause harm to the owners of the Fontainebleau, simply
because they built their swimming pool first. 76 Thus, the real issue is to
decide which party shall be harmed. 77 Economic analysis is directed toward
maximizing value by avoiding the more serious of the two harms.
7 1
166. Id. The term comes from the names of the first two economists to popularize the
concept.
167. Unless otherwise noted, efficiency will be measured by the Kaldor-Hicks standard in
this Comment.
168. Johnsen, supra note 160, at 270-74.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 273.
171. Id. at 270-71.
172. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1959), cited in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON.
1, 8 n.6 (1960).
173. Fontainebleau, 114 So. 2d at 358.
174. Id.
175. Coase, supra note 172, at 2-6.
176. See id. at 2.
177. See id.
178. See id.
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In the Fontainebleau example, the more serious harm is avoided by
allocating the entitlements of the parties and determining the appropriate
remedy.17 9 In this particular case, construction of the addition has not yet
begun. Thus, Fontainebleau is in the best position to determine what price
it would be willing to pay for its proposed addition, as opposed to some
other investment, or placing the addition elsewhere. Therefore, issuing an
injunction, which places the Fontainebleau in the position of negotiating
with the Eden Roc, should produce the more efficient outcome.'8 0 Alterna-
tively, had the Fontainebleau been at a stage of construction at which it
would be cheaper for the Eden Roc to move its cabana and swimming area,
enjoining the Fontainebleau would be inefficient because the Eden Roc would
be the cheapest cost-avoider.' s8
179. The Coase theorem postulates that, assuming transaction costs are near zero, the actual
result will be the same, regardless of the remedy. Id. at 8.
For example, suppose that the Fountainebleau values its addition at $1 million, and the Eden
Roc values its swimming pool at $500,000. If the injunction is denied, the addition will be
constructed. If a court issues an injunction in favor of the Eden Roc, the parties will negotiate
for the injunction to be dissolved at a price between $500,000 and $1 million, and the addition
will probably still be constructed.
Conversely, if the Fontainebleau only valued its addition at $500,000 and the Eden Roc
valued its pool at $1 million, the opposite result would obtain in either situation. If the
injunction is denied, the Eden Roc will negotiate with the Fontainebleau to prevent the addition;
if the injunction is granted, the addition will not be built. In short, the rule of law and the
remedy merely create an environment for negotiation.
The assumption that transaction costs are zero, however, is often unrealistic. Coase, supra
note 172, at 15. Transaction costs can be large and need to be considered. See id.; Coase, The
Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 183, 187 (1981). See also
supra note 160 (contrasting definitions of value).
180. Of course, there are other possible combinations of entitlements and remedies, including
damages. However, damages are not considered in detail here because they are not typically
sought in cases arising under the religion clauses. For a full discussion of the allocation of
entitlements and remedies, see, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Rv. 1089 (1972).
181. This is in fact the actual result in the case, although the economic rationale is implicit,
at best. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 361 (Fla.
1959).
Another example of the cheapest cost-avoider concept involves theories of tort liability familiar
to most first-year law students. Many torts, such as medical malpractice, are litigated on a
theory of negligence. Showing negligence requires proof of a duty from one party to another,
a breach of that duty by some act or omission, and the proximate and legal causation of an
injury to the other party. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed.
1971). Some torts, however, such as those involving defective products, proceed on a theory
of strict liability, which does not require a showing of fault akin to the breach of duty in
negligence. Id. § 75, at 494. Generally, either tort theory may be efficient. R. POSNER, supra
note 158, § 6.5, at 160-61. However, when a soda bottle explodes in the hand or face of a
consumer, strict liability may be more efficient for two reasons. First fault is not easily assigned,
because one is unsure if the explosion were due to a manufacturing defect or mishandling by
the shipper, the retailer or the consumer. Second, the manufacturer is the cheapest cost-avoider,
because it is in the best position to evaluate the cost of producing soda in bottles as opposed
to other, perhaps safer, containers. Johnsen, supra note 160, at 281.
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If judges explicitly decided cases on the above types of criteria,'1 2 economics
would become prescription, rather than a mere description of an efficient
result. In the past, economic analysis of law was largely confined to the
areas of antitrust and taxation. I"3 In the early 1960's, however, some proposed
that economic concepts may be applicable in many other fields of law.1 14
However, the idea that economic analysis may form a positive as well as
normative theory of law has not been without its critics. Many of the
objections to the economic approach are easily answered.' The bedrock
criticism of the theory, that value maximization is not an ethical or moral
theory upon which the law may be based, however, is not so easily dis-
missed. 6
B. Value Maximization as an Ethical Theory
Value maximization may be understood as an attempt to harmonize tele-
ological theories, such as utilitarianism, and deontological theories, such as
those growing out of the work of Immanuel Kant.8 7 Utilitarianism is some-
times criticized as often allowing the collective to trample individual rights,
whereas Kantian theories are occasionally disparaged as championing civil
liberties regardless of the consequences to the collective.' Consequently,
some have searched for theories that strike a balance between individual and
collective interests.8 9 Value maximization is one of the results of that search.
The science of economics and utilitarianism share many of the same
roots.90 Thus, some critics make the mistake of equating value maximization
with utilitarianism and then proceed to attack utilitarianism.19' These critics
miss some important distinctions between the two theories. 92
For example, the objection that utilitarianism would allow the collective
to unduly intrude on individual liberty has no counterpart in value maxi-
mization theory. Under a system of value maximization, the collective would
182. Judge Posner argues that common law judges implicitly attempt to make efficient
decisions. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 8.1, at 229-33.
183. Id. § 2.1, at 19.
184. See id. § 2.1, at 19-20. See also, e.g., P. BuRRows & C. V-uANOVSKI, THE ECONOIC
APPROACH TO LAW (1985); N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, LAW, EcoNoWcs AND PUBLIC POLICY 69-
116 (1984) (Chapter IV, The Economic Compensation Principle: Liability Rules and the Taking
Issue); Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics, " 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184,
187 (1983) (law and economics applied to study of law).
185. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 2.3, at 22-26.
186. Moreover, the author does not expect that the following textual discussion will in any
way impede the already voluminous body of writing on this subject.
187. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMCS OF JUSTICE 65-66 (1981).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 8.3, at 241.
191. Id. See, e.g., Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency? 98
HARv. L. REv. 592 (1985).
192. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 8.3., at 241.
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intrude on the individual only in cases where two elements are present. First,
there must be market failure, which is defined as a transaction by which
harmful effects are imposed on third parties. Market failure, however, is the
exception rather than the rule.' 93 Second, the harm caused by the market
failure must be greater than the harm that would be suffered by the preven-
tion of the transaction.' 94
In addition, utilitarianism faces the problem of interpersonal comparison
of utility-that it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare the happiness of
two persons. Economic analysis eliminates this problem by focusing on the
concept of value, rather than happiness.'95 The fallacy of equating value
maximization, which relies on the aggregate willingness to pay for goods
and services, with utilitarianism, which relies on the happiness principle, is
analogous to equating money with happiness, which would lead to the
conclusion that money can buy happiness. 196
Value maximization has been likened not only to utilitarianism, but also
to deontological principles akin to the Golden Rule. 197 First, economic anal-
ysis is primarily concerned with ex ante increases in societal value. Conse-
quently, a court employing economic analysis must treat the parties equally,
without reference to personal traits extrinsic to the dispute. 98 Second, eco-
nomic analysis asks judges to assume the role of a universal person, an
analysis at the root of ideas like the Golden Rule.199 Third, the concept of
consent, which complements the Kantian emphasis on personal autonomy,
represents the "willingness" concept underlying Pareto superiority. 20°
The first criticism of the deontological arguments for value maximization
is that equal treatment of persons is a mere procedural right. 20 1 Consequently,
one could conceive of a Hobbesian state of nature in which many substantive
rights are violated. 20 2 In short, because value maximization theory only
ensures equal treatment of persons, the argument is that value maximization
is an empty theory devoid of substantive rights and may allow equal treatment
of persons who are unequally situated.
193. R. POSNER, supra note 187, at 80.
194. In short, where either decision in a particular case will impose a cost on one of the
parties, the economically efficient decision cannot be reached unless one knows both the value
of what is gained and the value of what is lost. See Coase, supra note 172, at 2.
195. R. POSNER, supra note 187, at 60-61.
196. Id. at 63-64. Although value and happiness are both subjective, value is far more easily
measured. See supra note 160 (distinguishing definitions of value).
197. Cohen, A Justification of Social Wealth Maximization As a Rights-Based Ethical Theory,
10 HAgv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 411, 412 (1987).
198. Id. at 420-21. However, personal characteristics may influence calculation of damages.
See, e.g., CALABREsi, THE COST OF ACCmENTs 205-24 (1970).
199. Id.
200. R. POSNER, supra note 187, at 89.
201. Morawetz, Efficiency, Morality and Rights: the Significance of "Cleaning Up," 10
HAuv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 433, 441-43 (1987).
202. Id.
1260 [Vol. 39:1235
INVISIBLE HAND OF BELIEF
There are several responses to the criticisms above. The first is that
procedure is important, if not often crucial to the resolution of a dispute. 20 3
The second response is that equal treatment is only one of many rights that
may be derived from the concept of value maximization. Judge Posner goes
to great length in his treatise to demonstrate how entire systems of property, 2°4
contract, 20 5 and tort rights, 206 to name but a few, may be derived from the
value maximization principle. 2 7 The fact that these rights may not be absolute
merely eliminates the problems that would be engendered by a system based
solely on personal autonomy. 20 A third response is that even if one wants
a legal system that is not based entirely upon value maximization, economic
analysis can still be an important tool for decisionmaking. 209
The other strand of the first line of criticism, that value maximization
would allow for arbitrary treatment by treating unequal parties equally is
similarly unpersuasive. In essence, the criticism suggests that economic anal-
ysis has nothing to say about distributive justice, which focuses on the
relative equality or inequality of persons in a society. In reality, economic
analysis has much to say about distributive justice.2 1 0 Some equalization of
incomes arguably increases societal value. 21
The second line of criticism is directed against the concept of the economic
person as a rational maximizer of self-interest. One strand of the argument
is that economic analysis falsely assumes that people care solely about the
size of their own wallets. However, economic analysis makes no such as-
sumption. To the contrary, economic analysis often takes altruism and caring
for others into account.2 12 The other strand of the argument challenges the
203. To demonstrate the point, one need only think of one's favorite case involving due
process, jurisdiction, statutes of limitation, or rules of evidence (including the exclusionary
rule), to name but a few.
204. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 3.
205. Id. § 4.
206. Id. § 6.
207. Posner notes that moral principles such as honesty, truthfulness, meeting obligations,
selflessness, charity, neighborliness, and avoidance of coercion usually promote efficiency. R.
POSNER, supra note 158, § 8.3, at 238-39.
208. R. POSNER, supra note 187, at 98. It is also important to note that economic analysis
does not entirely foreclose the possibility of inalienable rights. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 180, at 1111-15.
209. As Judge Easterbrook has stated, the determination of societal values "falls on the
people and their representatives. The delicacy and indeterminacy of the task is no reason for
judges to pretend that there is no scarcity. Once they must deal with scarcity, they must deal
with economics." Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARv. L. REV.
622, 629 (1985).
210. See R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 16.
211. Id. § 16.2, at 436. The underlying assumption would be that all persons place the same
marginal value on money or that persons living in poverty place a higher marginal value on
money. This assumption is open to debate. In addition, the analysis does not account for the
costs of redistributing wealth, which could be significant.
212. See supra note 207. To the extent that an economic analysis may take intangible moral
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assumption of rationality. But attacking this assumption serves no point for
two reasons. First, the criticism demonstrates a lack of comprehension of
the very nature of science, because theories depend upon a certain level of
abstraction that is not reflected in reality. 21 3 Second, pointing out a theory's
shortcomings does not discredit the theory unless there are more powerful
theories available.
The third line of argument challenges value maximization's connection
with consent. 2 4 The focus of this argument is that consent is the basis of
Pareto-superiority, yet the economic analysis of law typically deals with
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency because courts may be unable to ensure Pareto-
superior results. The conclusion is that the economic analysis of law cannot
be supported by consent arguments because of the difference between Pareto-
superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. However, this argument rests on an
assumed definition of consent. This assumed definition would mandate that
not only the litigants, but also all relevant third parties, give their consent
to a given transaction. 215
Yet this is not the only definition of consent. Consent can just as easily
be defined in terms of consenting to a system. For example, this definition
of consent underlies the notion of the social contract. 216 For example, the
principles into account, the economic approach may at some point become consistent with the
public choice theory advocated by John Rawls in A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
Rawls bases his theory on several "principles of justice." First, the theory should provide
the maximum amount of liberty consistent with equal rights for all members of society. Second,
any inequalities engendered by the theory should ultimately work to the advantage of all
members of society. Third, the theory must allow opportunities for all members of society to
gain a favored position in the society. See R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAwLs 37-38 (1977).
213. For example, Newtonian physics, in positing that objects will accelerate at the same
speed through space, assumes a vacuum rarely present on earth. Further, the "Big Bang"
theory assumes that at some point in time, all matter in the universe was once compressed to
the size of a pinhead.
214. In fact, some economists exclude nonvoluntary transactions from the definition of
efficiency. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 1.2, at 12.
215. Judge Posner admits that if all transactions must be strictly voluntary, the power of
the argument is diminished because so few transactions have the consent of every affected
party. Judge Posner's solution under a Kaldor-Hicks analysis is to decide whether a voluntary
transaction could or would have occurred in a given situation. Id. § 1.2, at 14. For a further
discussion of the economics of multi-party transactions, compare Aivazian & Callen, The Coase
Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. & ECON. 175 (1981), with Coase, supra note 179.
216. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1963); J.J. ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCtAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (tran. G.D.H. Cole 1950).
In this respect, a comparison between Posner and Rawls is illuminating. Both Rawls and
Posner are contractarians. Both theories require universal persons to make a choice about the
society in which they want to live. R. POSNER, supra note 187, at 99. Thus, both theories must
rest on arguments from inferred consent instead of autonomy, because the choice made by the
universal persons are then imposed as reality. See Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 563, 573-79 (1980); Cohen, supra note 197, at 417. Dworkin, however, is hostile to value
maximization theory. Nevertheless, he does concede that value maximization might be considered
a valid ethical theory if interpreted as a theory of natural responsibility: a theory which dictates
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United States and state constitutions can be seen as social contracts. 2 7 These
social contracts, to which the citizenry has consented, establish the protection
of certain rights, as well as legislative, executive and judicial bodies that
govern the behavior of the populace. Those bound to the social contract
need not unanimously approve every governmental act to satisfy the require-
ment of consent; if such a requirement were necessary, few governmental
actions would be valid."' 8
This second definition of consent is compatible with value maximization.
It is possible to consent to a system that employs Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,
perhaps even desirable to do so if one expects everyone to benefit from such
a system in the long run. The fact that a party may not consent to every
decision made under that system is then not crucial to the validity of the
system as a whole.
In sum, it is safe to say that value maximization is not a perfect ethical
or moral theory. But value maximization is an ethical theory, one that can
insure both procedural and substantive rights, that attempts to strike an
uneasy balance between the demands of the individual and the collective.
Value maximization achieves this balance by blending elements of utilitari-
anism and deontological theories while eliminating the more problematic
aspects of each. Professor Morawetz has argued that this argument is akin
to "saying that if a snow plow and a tractor are both defective tools for
that people take responsibility for those costs which would have been assigned to a person by
law in a community in which public and private action were consistent with a sense of justice
and equal concern for all. See Dworkin, supra, at 586-90.
Moreover, both Posner and Rawls have analogous concepts of law. Rawls identifies four
elements of law. First, law must be capable of being complied with by the persons to which
the law is directed. Second, the law must treat equally persons who are similarly situated.
Third, the law must be public, rather than secret. Fourth, the law must provide procedures for
finding the truth of those facts necessary to decide a case. J. RAwLs, supra note 212, at 237-
39 (1971). All four of these elements are a part of the economic analysis of law. R. POSNER,
supra note 158, § 8.4, at 242-43.
One of the chief differences between the theories of Rawls and Posner is their respective
assumptions about human nature. Rawls assumes that people, in what he calls "the original
position" behind a "veil of ignorance," would choose to live in a society which maximizes the
utility of the worst-off segment of the society. In short, Rawls assumes persons are generally
risk averse. By contrast, Posner assumes that persons are more individualistic, entrepreneurial,
and congenial to risk-taking. For a more detailed comparison, see R. POSNER, supra note 158,
§ 16.3, at 437-38, R. POSNER, supra note 187, at 100-01.
217. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 170 (1960) (referring to Locke's
treatise as "outstanding in its lasting effects"); H. HOCKET, Tt CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1776-1826, AT 64, 110-12, 121-22 (1939) (influence of Locke on framers
of Constitution).
218. "A characteristic product of a democratic-perhaps of any-legislative process is the
unprincipled redistribution of wealth in favor of politically effective interest groups." R. POSNER,
supra note 158, § 24.4, at 586. See also Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 263, 269 (1982) (it is possible "to classify
statutes between those that advance the public interest and those that advance instead the
interest of some (narrow) interest group.").
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brain surgery, and if a meat cleaver is different from both a snow plow and
a tractor, then a meat cleaver is a fit tool for brain surgery.' '219 But this
statement misrepresents the argument. The argument is that at the very least,
a meat cleaver is as fit a tool for brain surgery as those tools employed by
others. Moreover, it is possible that the meat cleaver, by eliminating the
obvious defects of the snow plow and the tractor, may in fact be a more
fitting tool for brain surgery, perhaps the best tool, assuming there are no
scalpels.
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Economic Analysis and the Constitution220
An economic analysis of the United States Constitution suggests that it
"differs from an ordinary statute in (1) its costs of enactment (including
amendment) and, less distinctly, (2) its subject matter. "221 The first difference
suggests that the durability of the Constitution is enhanced by the general
rule that courts will give a more flexible interpretation to the Constitution
than to an ordinary statute. 222 The implications of the second difference, the
Constitution's subject matter, depend in large measure upon which portion
of the document is examined.
From an economic perspective, those provisions of the Constitution re-
specting federalism and the separation of powers serve the purpose of
preventing the concentration of coercive power by government, a monopoly
which potentially would be extremely costly. 223 Consequently, erecting cost
barriers to governmental collusion would be justified.
However, Judge Posner claims that the analysis changes for those portions
of the Constitution, including the religion clauses, that guarantee personal
rights. Judge Posner asserts that while some of the personal rights ensured
by the first amendment, such as the protection of political speech, are
necessary to maintain decentralized government, freedom of religion may be
solely personal. 224 In sum, the protection of personal, nonpolitical rights may
be seen as entrenched interest-group protection. 2
25
219. Morawetz, supra note 201, at 436.
220. Economic analysis of the Constitution conceptually predates the "new law and econom-
ics" school commonly associated with Judge Posner. See C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1972) (1st printing 1913).
Beard argued that commonly accepted analyses of the Constitution underestimate the eco-
nomic interests that motivated many of the framers. According to Beard, by the end of the
19th century, the "realistic view of the Constitution"-one arising from "an alignment of
economic interests"-was "submerged in abstract discussions of states' rights and national
sovereignty and in formal, logical, and discriminative analyses of judicial opinions." Id. at vi.
However, Beard did not perform an economic analysis of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
221. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 24.1, at 581.
222. Id.
223. Id. § 24.2, at 583.
224. Id. § 24.3, at 585.
225. See id.
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Arguably, the religion clauses do fall into the category of political rights
that help ensure the decentralization of the coercive power of the state.
Without the establishment clause, one could at least imagine the possibility
of a nation controlled by a theocracy outside the cost barriers erected by
the Constitution. And while the free exercise clause can be seen as interest-
group protection, such protection may be justified by the influence which
religion and religious belief has on the moral, ethical, and ultimately political
life of the nation. 226
Regardless of whether the protection given to religion is justified by its
(historical) relationship to politics and government, the fact remains that the
religion clauses are indeed a part of the Constitution. Identification of the
clauses as interest-group protection is not inconsistent with the underlying
history of their passage. 2 7 In fact, the economic interpretation of the clauses
suggests at least one reason why the clauses are perceived to be in tension
with each other. That is, if the clauses were drafted to insulate the private
sphere of religion from the public sector, and vice versa, then the expansion
of the public sector would seem to be at least partially responsible for the
tension between the clauses. 22 Thus, it would be desirable to articulate a
theory of the religion clauses that functions smoothly in a society where the
line between public and private, between government action and inaction,
has become less distinct.
B. Developing An Economic Model of the Religion Clauses
A theory of the religion clauses based on economic analysis is well-suited
to solving the problems of religion clause jurisprudence in the modern era
for several reasons. First, value maximization is equipped to tackle the
relationship of the individual to the state. 229 Second, insofar as the religion
clauses deal with "aid" to religion, and competing theories wrestle with the
definition of "aid," economic concepts may offer a fresh perspective. Third,
the concept of joint causality eliminates the harm/benefit dichotomy for
which competing theories are criticized, focusing instead on the issues of
social cost and finding the cheapest cost-avoider. 2 0
Interestingly, Judge Posner has not had much to say about applying
economic analysis to the religion clauses.2 1' This is particularly unusual
because Judge Posner has written opinions in cases dealing with each of the
226. "[R]eligious groups inevitably represent certain points of view and not infrequently
assert them in the political arena, as evidenced by the continuing debate respecting birth control
and abortion laws." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 693 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See also Giannella, supra note 14, at 1404 (regulation of citizens and states represents basic
values largely influenced by Judeaeo-Christian tradition of religion and the conception of man
in Bill of Rights).
227. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 187-219 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., supra note 181 and accompanying text.
231. But see McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom,
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clauses. 32 However, in his treatise, 233 he briefly suggests two possible ways
of viewing the religion clauses. First, the clauses may be viewed as anti-
discrimination measures.23 4 Second, a violation of the religion clauses may
be viewed as an unduly harsh redistribution of value, analogous to a taking
of property without just compensation.235 The Comment will discuss each
possibility and develop an economic model of the religion clauses that
incorporates both rationales.
The first possible purpose of the religion clauses is that of preventing
discrimination on religious grounds. To the economist, discrimination is
consistent with concepts of efficiency. 236 For example, a consumer making
a choice among several different brands of the same product could be said
to be discriminating. However, it does not necessarily follow that discrimi-
nation against persons on the basis of race or religion is efficient. When one
group discriminates against another, neither group profits.21 7 Those who
discriminate may refuse to enter into transactions with members of the
disfavored group that would increase their wealth comparative to the same
transaction with a member of the favored group.238 Members of the disfa-
vored group will suffer reductions in income from discrimination. 23 9 If the
disfavored group is a minority, those losses in income will be proportionately
greater than those suffered by the discriminating person.
214
The losses suffered by both groups are economic disincentives to discrim-
ination, so long as the market is not allowed to become a monopoly through
government action. 241 If there is free competition, unbiased traders will
become the market leaders. 242 Thus, it should not be surprising that the
constitutional justification for anti-discrimination statutes lies in the pro-
motion of interstate commerce; 243 such laws promote efficiency.
56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1989) (published during the editing of this Comment), noted in Epstein,
supra note 104, at 83 n.235.
232. See ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (establishment
clause claim protesting display of latin cross during Christmas season); Menora v. Illinois High
School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (free exercise claim of orthodox Jewish
high school students against rule prohibiting student basketball players from wearing headgear).
See also May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,
J.) (teacher group seeking to hold religious meetings at school before the school opens under
free speech clause).
233. R. POSNER, supra note 158.
234. Cf. id. § 27 (analogy to racial discrimination).
235. Id. § 24.3, at 586.
236. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 27.1, at 526.
237. G. BECKER, THE EcoNomcs OF DiscRmNATION 11 (1957); R. POSNER, supra note 158,
§ 27.1, at 615.
238. R. POSNER, supra note 158, § 27.1, at 615.
239. Id.
240. Id. Moreover, any retaliatory discrimination by the minority against the majority will
only serve to further injure the minority. G. BECKER, supra note 237, at 24.
241. See R. PosNER, supra note 158, § 27.1, at 616-17.
242. Id. § 27.1, at 616.
243. Id. § 27.4, at 621.
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The implications of the above argument as applied to the religion clauses
are fairly simple to discern. The establishment clause, by preventing govern-
ment from preferring or disfavoring any group of religious interests, keeps
sects active, competitive,2 " and perhaps less prone to discriminate. The free
exercise clause, by protecting the individual's religious beliefs, provides yet
another barrier to discrimination by government.
However, an economic model of the religion clauses based on an analogy
to a taking of property without just compensation takes not only the anti-
discriminatory aspect of the clauses into account, but also touches on many
other concerns in religion clause jurisprudence. An economic model of the
religion clauses might then resemble the efficiency-based test for just com-
pensation associated with Professor Michelman. 241
Professor Michelman identifies three quantities that would be weighed to
determine whether government should compensate for a taking of property.
First, there are demoralization costs, which are defined as the sum of the
loss of value accruing to the losing parties and their sympathizers, and the
value of lost future production caused by the demoralization of all parties
disturbed by the possibility of like treatment in the future. 24 Second, there
are the settlement costs necessary to avoid demoralization costs, including:
the cost of settling claims similar to the case at issue; the costs of adjudicating
the claims which are not settled; and the cost of settling or adjudicating all
claims which would not have been brought if the initial claim had not gone
forward, minus any savings in demoralization costs for claims which are not
judicially recognized. 24 7 Third, there are the efficiency gains that would accrue
as a result of the government action.24
8
In a system based on value maximization, efficient measures would be
presumptively valid. But Professor Michelman notes that the general defi-
nition of efficiency "takes no account of demoralization costs caused by a
244. See generally Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between sects.").
245. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1214-18. See also B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION, ch.3 (1977). The approach is a "hybrid of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
criteria." Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1581, 1584 (1988). Professor Michelman's approach has been analyzed and criticized by
both economists and legal scholars. See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:
An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 569, 579 (1984) ("Michelman's analysis of demor-
alization and settlement costs is somewhat sketchy, and the efficiency implications of that
analysis are not clear."); Fisher, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Clause,
88 COLtUM. L. REv. 1774, 1771-81 (1988) (Michelman's measurement of demoralization costs is
incomplete); Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509, 522-
36 (1986) (Michelman's insurance and risk analysis is flawed); Ross-Ackerman, Against Ad
Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697, 1697 (1988) (Michelman is
wrong in concluding that the "Supreme Court is 'moving noticably towards a reformalization
of regulatory-taking doctrine' and "that the Court should instead engage in balancing.").
246. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1214.
247. Id. at 1214 & n.99.
248. Id. at 1214. Note, these must be exclusive of the above-mentioned costs.
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capricious redistribution, or alternatively, of the settlement costs necessary
to avoid such demoralization costs.' '249
Of course, the definition of demoralization costs is crucial to Michelman's
formulation of the problem.25 ° Professor Michelman posits that people de-
mand compensation caused by purposeful social action. Michelman then
defends this assumption by imputing purposiveness to the actions of a
collective, as opposed to more random forces such as earthquakes, tornadoes,
and the like. The argument asserts that the individual can obtain insurance
in the latter case, but not in the former case. The conclusion of the argument
is that the risk of being systematically exploited by others is of a far greater
magnitude than the risk of an occasional accident.25 1
Michelman then identifies situations in which there will be a remedy for
systematic exploitation. First, there will be a remedy when either of the two
costs would exceed efficiency gains. There will be a remedy whenever there
is a capricious redistribution which could have easily been avoided.2 12 This
ground for relief is clearly tied to the concept of the cheapest cost-avoider.
Second, there will be a remedy where the efficiency argument supporting the
government action is tenuous. 2 1
The "balancing" model developed by Michelman can then inform an
analysis of the religion clauses in several ways. First, by focusing on the risk
249. Id. at 1215.
250. The formulation of demoralization costs has also been one of the more discussed and
criticized aspects of the Michelman approach. Fisher, supra note 245, at 1777-81. Generally,
the economic criticisms of the demoralization cost concept relate to insurance. For example,
some have suggested that it is more efficient for individuals to insure themselves because the
assurance of compensation will lead people to overinvest in their property, confident that all
investment will be compensated. Kaplow, supra note 245, at 529. Economists call this problem
"moral hazard." Ross-Ackerman, supra note 245, at 1705.
Assuming the argument to be correct, there are several replies. First, to this author's
knowledge, private insurance is currently unavailable for both takings and infringements on
religious liberty. Consequently, granting a remedy, such as compensation for a taking, may
serve to efficiently distribute the risk of government action throughout society. See id. Second,
private insurance is unlikely to be written because insurance companies may have less information
about the risk of government action than the owners of property rights or religious rights. See
id. (in takings context). Third, important parts of the demoralization cost concept would remain
even if moral hazard were factored out of the formula. The individual's demoralization in a
particular case would remain, as would demoralization that accrues to those who lose some
measure of faith or consent in the legal system. Fisher, supra note 245, at 1779-80. Fourth,
granting a remedy is generally preferred in order to promote productive efficiency. Johnsen,
supra note 160, at 273-73.
251. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1217.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1218. See also Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 1, 18 (1986) (impermissible purpose for legislative action which restricts speech may be
inferred from inefficiency). Inferring purpose in the absence of direct evidence is efficient
because it may avoid the problem of settlement costs caused by "false signalling," which may
include the adjustment of the legislative process so that otherwise unconstitutional measures
appear lawful.
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of systematic exploitation, the model is analogous to the anti-discrimination
rationale discussed above, but applies to a broader set of concerns. Second,
the model removes the problem of discerning intent that plagues the first
prong of the Lemon test. Third, economic analysis, by identifying situations
in which government is the cheapest cost-avoider or the efficiency argument
is tenuous, can help separate justifiable secular ends from the impermissibly
sectarian.
C. Applications
Generally, cases arising under the establishment clause require the Court
to answer one of two basic questions. The first question is whether some
support of religion must be excluded from a more general, neutral govern-
ment program. The other common question is whether an exemption for
religion specified by law is valid. Similarly, cases that arise under the free
exercise clause tend to pose one of two basic questions. The first question
is whether persons are entitled to an exemption from a general governmental
program due to their religious beliefs. The second question is whether a
religion-based exclusion from a government program is valid. 214
The following portion of this Comment examines how religion clause
jurisprudence might look if the Supreme Court applied the economic model
discussed above.
1. The Establishment Clause
a. Must religion be excluded from a general program?
Typically, this is the question presented by cases involving governmental
attempts to aid nonpublic schools. The first way in which econcmic analysis
may illuminate this problem is by helping define "aid." Aid is understood
by the economist to mean a subsidy. 25 An economic analysis of the problem
indicates that the distinctions drawn by the Court are often as unconvincing
as they would be to the ordinary observer.
Parents generally want their children to be educated for two reasons. First
there are the internal benefits of education that accrue to the individual
child and to the family. 2 6 Second, there are the external benefits of education,
254. This framework is derived from McConnell, supra note 36.
255. The Court sometimes describes impermissible aid to religious schools using the term
"subsidy." See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985). However,
the assertion that aid to sectarian schools is a potential subsidy rests on the premise that funds
are fungible, and thus, such aid may free up other capital for the religious mission of a school.
See Garvey, supra note 78, at 79-83. Yet this theory would seem to suggest that all aid to
religious schools is impermissible because any aid necessarily lightens the burden on the aided
institution. The theory would equate to strict separation, along with the concomitant faults of
that theory. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
256. West, An Economic Analysis of the Law and Politics of Non-Public School "Aid, " 19
J.L. & EcoN. 79, 79 (1976).
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such as crime reduction and economic growth, which are shared and desired
by all members of the society. 217
The desire for the public benefits of education explains why the general
public taxes itself to provide for education; taxes serve to internalize the
external benefits of education. 28 However, in a society governed in part by
the establishment clause, there will be those who seek to prevent tax dollars
from flowing to parochial schools. These objections are far more likely to
be directed at the internal benefits provided by sectarian schools, which
include the inculcation of religious belief, than at the external benefits, which
are generally the same, if not greater than those provided by public education.
The separation of religious schools and public schools will have the
economic effect of making religious tuition more expensive and public tuition
less expensive. 2 9 However, there are two important features of this arrange-
ment that should be noted. First, religious families will not be paying twice
if they are still required to pay taxes for public education. Instead, religious
families are paying for internal benefits of education at the sectarian school
while still paying taxes for the external benefits of public schools. 260 In this
sense, religious families are no more burdened than are childless taxpayers.
Second, the public funding of public schools in this situation is not a
subsidy to public school users. The public's demand is for the external
benefits of education, which is jointly supplied with internal benefits. 261 The
joint supply of benefits in education is analogous to more common examples,
such as the markets for both beef and leather from cattle. 262 The internal
benefits of education could be beef; the external benefits could be hides.
The price in each market will depend on the demand in the other market. 263
A change in the price of a good resulting from a change in the demand for
another good is not a subsidy. 26
However, 'this analysis calls into question not only the Court's application
of the Lemon test, but also the Court's attempt to restrict governmental aid
of religious schools to secular teaching and materials. While the Court tends
to find that there is a secular purpose in school aid cases, many attempts to
help sectarian schools fail the effect and/or entanglement prongs of the
Lemon test. 261 In applying the effect and entanglement prongs, the Court
attempts to demand that products which are jointly supplied be separately
supplied.2 6 Where two quantities are jointly supplied, there are no "primary
257. Id. at 79, 84.
258. Id. at 84.
259. Id. at 84-85.
260. Id. at 84.
261. Id. at 84-85.
262. Demsetz, Joint Supply and Price Discrimination, 16 J.L. & ECON. 389, 390 (1973).
263. West, supra note 256, at 84-85.
264. Id. at 86.
265. "As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the [purpose]
test." Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
266. West, supra note 256, at 86.
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effects"; the effects are jointly produced. Requiring that the internal and
external benefits of religious education be separately produced makes as
much sense to the economist as asking a cattle rancher to produce beef
without producing hides or vice versa. Likewise, the internal and external
benefits of education, whether religious or secular, are as inherently entangled
as are the beef and leather of cattle.
The conclusion that government may purchase the external benefits of
religious education without subsidizing internal benefits does not necessarily
mandate the conclusion that any form of aid to sectarian schools would be
constitutional.2 67 Some forms of aid might in fact result in a subsidy to
religious schools. Other forms of aid might well unconstitutionally discrim-
inate between sects.
Under the Michelman-inspired model proposed by this Comment, aid to
nonpublic schools would be presumptively valid if the government makes a
nontenuous argument that such aid is efficient. As the discussion above
indicates, the purchase of the external benefits of education in order to
reduce crime and promote economic growth will probably suffice to establish
a presumption of validity. Thus, a court would be forced to determine
whether the supposed gain in societal value resulting from various types of
aid might be outweighed by either demoralization or settlement costs.
Demoralization costs might be extensive in the school aid context for
several reasons. First, there is the perceived symbolic link between govern-
ment and religion engendered by aid to sectarian institutions. The symbolic
link is emphasized because there are situations where government action may
coincide with religious belief without raising the perception that government
is advancing religion in the mind of the ordinary observer. For example,
laws against murder, which mirror prohibitions against killing found in
Judaism, Christianity and perhaps other religions, do not raise such a
perception.2 61 In contrast, the provision of funds by government to an
institution engaged in the inculcation of religious belief or the intertwining
of secular and religious personnel may raise a perception of establishment.2 69
The result may be great discomfort to members of the community on grounds
of principle or on the ground that they are receiving treatment different
from religious families. This sort of discomfort, if made public, is perhaps
267. Not that an economic analysis focused only on economic subsidies and penalties could
not reach this conclusion. See Epstein, supra note 104, at 83 (citing McConnell & Posner, supra
note 231).
268. Government action is not unconstitutional simply because it "happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442
(1961). Otherwise, "the State could not criminalize murder for fear that it would thereby
promote the Biblical command against killing." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
269. This would be a stronger argument at the primary and secondary school level than at
the college or university level. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development: Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HA.v. L. REV. 513, 516 (1968).
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what the Court has referred to as "divisiveness. '270 In short, the demorali-
zation cost analysis looks not to effect or entanglement, because both will
usually obtain in the economic sense; rather it looks to the perception of
the government action and its ultimate effect on the community.
Settlement costs may also be high. The costs of adjudicating or settling a
particular suit and settling or adjudicating similar claims that would not
have been brought if the initial claim had not been recognized are high
enough.21 However, in the context of the religion clauses there are further
potential costs. The costs attributable to judicial error are potentially high,
particularly when attempting to steer a course between two (or three)22
potentially conflicting clauses of the Constitution. 273 The error costs may
even compound themselves because decisions which rest upon fine or fuzzy
distinctions may encourage later actions which become the subject of liti-
gation. 27 4
By focusing on the symbolic link between religion and government, and
the divisiveness engendered by a perceived link, the Court would be able to
fashion a more coherent body of law in this category of cases. If the busing
of children to parochial schools could be justified by the Court as a consti-
tutional safety measure, then it is possible that busing the same children on
field trips may not create a stronger symbolic link or create further divi-
siveness.275 Likewise, if the Court can find that the loan of a science book
does not create those evils which the religion clauses are designed to prevent,
then it is possible that the loan of a science kit may not cross over the
constitutional line.27 6 And the Court would have to consider whether the
270. Political divisiveness along religious lines is sometimes considered by the Court as
evidence of excessive entanglement, but the Court has never invalidated a governmental act
based on divisiveness alone. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). Moreover, the
Court has generally limited its consideration of divisiveness to cases involving direct govern-
mental financial aid to religious schools and institutions. Id.; Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct.
2562, 2578 n.14 (1988) (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 n.ll (1983)).
271. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1214.
272. Cases involving the religion clauses may also raise free speech issues, and vice versa.
See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
273. Cf. Posner, supra note 253, at 25. Judge Posner notes that the potential for error is
especially high, given that most judges tend to be members of the dominant groups in society,
thus perhaps reducing judicial sensitivity to the claims of nondominant views. Although the
point is made by Judge Posner in the context of free speech, the analogy to the religion clause
context seems simple, given the connection between religion and expression. See also McConnell
& Posner, supra note 231, at II (laws touching religion held to a stricter efficiency standard
than laws touching speech because government may promote speech but not religion).
274. For example, one could look at the number of cases involving aid to nonpublic schools.
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973)
(noting repeated governmental attempts to help nonpublic schools). One could also examine
the confusion in the lower courts engendered by the decision of Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984).
275. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
276. See id.
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symbolic value of forcing low-income students in religious schools to attend
remedial programs off-campus is worth the societal cost. 2"
b. May religion be specifically exempted from a program?
A typical exemption issue involves exempting a religious institution from
various forms of taxation by government. 278 Analogous to the discussion of
the school aid cases, it may be helpful to ask whether tax exemptions can
be construed as a subsidy to religion. 279 In the context of exemptions, the
answer is much easier to obtain.
In order to conclude that tax exemptions are subsidies, one must start
with the premise that government owns the gross national product (GNP),
or at least owns some portion of the GNP which can be identified for the
purposes of litigation. 2 0 To disprove the argument, one need only consider
one's own personal income tax return. Assuming that government is not
taxing individual income at the rate of 100% each person or family has
some income remaining. This remaining income could be viewed as the
accumulation of various tax exemptions. But in a capitalistic society in which
many people do not work for the government, it would be odd to call one's
after-tax income a governmental subsidy.
Moreover, in a society that identifies religion and religious pluralism as
two of its values, government may wish to avoid the appearance of using
the power to tax as a power to destroy28 ' either value. Finally, government
may find that religious organizations provide certain secular external benefits
to the community-"good works." Government may then decide to offset
those external benefits by allowing religious institutions to externalize their
costs in the form of a tax exemption. 2 2
Taking the factors discussed above into account, this Comment's economic
model provides a coherent explanation of the Court's decisions in the context
of exemptions. Justice Brennan's interpretation of Walz in Texas Monthly,
regardless of its accuracy as a matter of history, provides a guidepost.
Promoting intellectual pluralism and private initiative within a community
277. See T. VITULLO-MARTIN & B. COOPER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND CHILD: THE CON-
STITUTION AND FEDERAL AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 41-66 (1987), cited in Laycock, supra note
139, at 1008 n.48.
278. E.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (sales tax exemption for
religious periodicals invalidated); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax deductions for
tuition and educational materials upheld); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property
exemption for religious organizations upheld).
279. The Court has answered this question in the affirmative. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at
899 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)).
280. West, supra note 256, at 96. See also Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution,
78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1288 (1969) (tax statutes can always be written in terms of inclusion, rather
than exclusion, thus weakening supposition that an "exemption" is clearly defined).
281. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
282. Posner, supra note 253, at 20-21 (good works as basis for common law exemptions
from tort liability for religious and charitable institutions).
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may well be accepted as an efficient governmental objective. Demoralization
costs resulting from such an exemption, as well as the settlement costs
necessary to avoid demoralization, are far more likely to be low when there
is no appearance of sectarian discrimination.2"3 Thus, more inclusive statutes,
such as the exemptions at issue in Walz are more likely to withstand scrutiny
than the narrower exemption in Texas Monthly, which not only focused
solely on religious organizations, but also seemed to exclude agnostic and
atheistic viewpoints .284
c. The display of religious symbols by government
This category is meant to cover the class of recent cases typified by Lynch
v. Donnelly"5 and Marsh v. Chambers,28 6 which seem to resist application
of the Lemon test.2 7 As in the other types of establishment clause cases
discussed above, the display of religious symbols by government may not
involve a subsidy to religion. Nevertheless, under the economic model of
this Comment, it is likely that this sort of "aid" would be unconstitutional.
While the Court has struggled with its own articulation of establishment
clause doctrine, 28 there is a simple reason why the governmental display of
religious symbols would be invalid under this Comment's economic test;
under an economic analysis, government-sponsored religious displays are
directly analogous to the type of nuisance created by competing hotels on
the Florida coast. 289 Thus, the cheapest cost-avoider should be enjoined. 29°
In cases like Lynch, government will probably be the cheapest cost-avoider
for several reasons. First, under the Michelman-inspired model, the govern-
ment's efficiency arguments are likely to be tenuous. For example, the
arguments typically advanced by government in favor of sponsoring a creche
are that the display promotes both local retail sales ' 9' and the celebration of
the Christmas holiday through traditional symbols.2 92 Yet government would
be perfectly capable of promoting both goals through the display of tradi-
tional symbols other than those depicting the birth of Christ.
293
283. Cf. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1216 (arguing a "special urgency in the demand for
publicly financed compensation when a loss has evidently been occasioned by deliberate social
action") (footnote omitted).
284. 109 S. Ct. 890, 907 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
285. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
286. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
287. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 36-90 and accompanying text.
289. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
1959); supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
290. See supra note 179-81 and accompanying text.
291. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
292. Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
293. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3114 (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Cf. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) (public display of Latin
cross).
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Furthermore, demoralization costs are likely to be high. The governmental
display of a creche, regardless of its status as a traditional holiday symbol,
creates a symbolic link between government and Christian sects that may
offend the non-Christians in the community and erode confidence in gov-
ernment. The demoralization caused by a government-sponsored creche may
also cause "outsiders" to avoid the creche, thus depriving them of the use
of publicly-funded streets and sidewalks.294
Alternatively, the settlement costs may be high.29 1 Governmental sponsor-
ship of a creche is likely to prompt demands for equal treatment of other
sects, demands that will be impossible to satisfy in many instances.296 Ag-
nostics and atheists may have no symbols which the government could
display, even if it wanted to do so. Even if the claims of atheists and
agnostics could be set aside, the vast religious pluralism in the United
States, 297 pluralism that is seemingly promoted by the religion clauses, 29s
294. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d at 275. Interestingly, the Court found the avoidance cost
to be the basis of plaintiff's standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Id.
The standing doctrine focuses on whether the plaintiff is a party entitled to the adjudication
of the dispute. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Standing has both constitutional
requirements, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982), and prudential requirements. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-502. One
of the prudential requirements bars suits by taxpayers to redress "generalized grievance[s]"
shared by the public at large. Id. at 499; Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
The Court, however, has recognized an exception to this rule in the establishment clause context.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104-06 (1968). The Flast Court held that taxpayers could sue
where they could establish a "nexus" between a congressional expenditure under the taxing
and spending clause of the Constitution and a specific constitutional limit on the taxing and
spending clause, such as the establishment clause. Id. at 102.
Nevertheless, this exception to the general bar against taxpayers suits is quite narrow. In
Valley Forge, the Court distinguished Flast on the grounds that the former involved a transfer
of property by an administrative agency under the control of the executive. Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 479-80. Without passing judgment on the validity of these distinctions, the economic
model presented in this Comment would be consistent with stringent standing requirements
insofar as such requirements would be necessary to prevent the problem of infinite regress in
calculating costs. See Michelman, supra note 4, at 1215 n.100.
295. See Grady, Yuletide: A Season for Lights and Lawsuits, Chicago Trib., Nov. 24, 1989,
at 1, col. 2. ("The threat of lawsuits has been enough to convince officials in some suburbs to
abandon their holiday traditions.").
296. See McGough, Menorah Wars, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1990, at 12. See also Letter
from William J. Murphy to the editors of NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 19, 1990, at 6, col. 3 (concerning
the creche at issue in Lynch):
The city fathers of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, ostensibly fearful of the possibility
of vandalism, chose to erect this past year's Nativity scene in the monkey house of
the municipal park zoo. The stench and screeching of the primates, although not
of the ox and lamb variety, did lend a certain authentic, if not quite reverent,
flavor.
Id.
297. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 51-53 (105th ed. 1985) (cited in Shaman, Observations on the Theory of
Government Accommodation of Religion, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 348 (1988)). See also Smith,
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
makes it at least possible that there would not be enough property available
to government to equally display symbols of all religions, resulting in sec-
tarian discrimination.
The litigation engendered by the Lynch decision demonstrates the addi-
tional settlement costs inflicted on society by the Court's rationale, which
rested in part on the idea that the creche was somehow "neutralized" by
the remaining secular portion of the city's holiday display. 299 For example,
future litigation may involve distinguishing between a painted creche and an
unpainted creche, a large creche and a small creche, and the distance of the
creche from the "neutralizing" secular symbols. 3' °
In sum, the efficiency gains, if any, of governmental-sponsored religious
displays are meager. The divisiveness caused by a display that links religion
and government and the litigation that ensues inflict large costs on the entire
society. Thus, cases like Lynch would be wrongly decided under this Com-
ment's economic model.
Consequently, the establishment clause would look slightly different under
this Comment's economic approach. Government would be allowed more
discretion in aiding nonpublic schools. Inclusive religious exemptions from
government programs would probably still survive, although careful drafting
would be necessary to avoid the appearance of sectarian discrimination.
However, the governmental sponsorship of religious symbols would rarely,
if ever, be sustained.
2. The Free Exercise Clause
a. Is a religious exemption from a general program required?
This category of cases represents the bulk of free exercise claims, including
cases such as Sherbert, Yoder, Lee, and Goldman.3 °0 An economic interpre-
tation of the free exercise clause's textually weak protection of religion would
allow government to impose costs on the exercise of religion, but those costs
could not be unreasonably high.10 2 This Comment's economic model com-
ports with this general interpretation of the free exercise clause.
Relations Between Church and State in the United States, With Special Attention to the
Schooling of Children, 35 AM. J. Cori,. L. 1, 4-15 (1987) (detailing religious pluralism even
among dominant sects in the United States).
298. McConnell, supra note 36, at 14-15.
299. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 705-06 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
300. "It would be appalling to conduct litigation under the Establishment Clause as if it
were a trademark case, with . . . witnesses testifying that they were offended-but would have
been less so were the creche five feet closer to the jumbo candy cane." American Jewish
Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
301. See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
302. See Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1982).
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In the leading case, Sherbert v. Verner,3°3 the religious believer desired an
exemption from a state unemployment insurance program.3 0 Mrs. Sherbert,
a Seventh-Day Adventist, wanted compensation for being fired because she
refused to work on her Sabbath, which was Saturday. °0 The Court held that
an exemption was compelled by the free exercise clause,3° yet Justice Stewart
argued that such an exemption would conflict with the Court's establishment
clause jurisprudence because the state would be then be required to financially
aid Mrs. Sherbert's religious beliefs and practices.3 7
Viewed in the context of this Comment's economic model, the Court
would begin by examining the purported efficiency gains of the state's
unemployment scheme. Unemployment compensation might be purely redis-
tributive, which weighs against a finding of efficiency.30 8 Nevertheless, by
the time Sherbert was decided, the Court accepted the idea that unemploy-
ment compensation benefits all members of society.3°9 Thus, the scheme
would probably be presumptively valid.
On the other hand, demoralization costs might exceed the common benefits
of the scheme. Mrs. Sherbert and all others similarly situated might well feel
upset when the state, relying on somewhat ambiguous statutory language,
sends the message that its citizens' religious beliefs are not a suitable reason
to warrant compensation from a fund to which they are compelled to
contribute. This would be especially true where the scheme did afford a
303. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
304. Id. at 401.
305. Id. at 399-400.
306. Id. at 409.
307. Id. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). As Professor Epstein analyzes the
case, the difference between Justice Brennan's majority opinion and Justice Stewart's concur-
rence lies in the scope of each opinion. Epstein, supra note 104, at 81-83 (referring to scope
of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as well as view of program). The majority is looking
at the unemployment compensation scheme as a whole, whereas Justice Stewart is looking at
each individual item covered by insurance. Id. at 84-85. For Justice Stewart, religious reasons
are not covered; thus, compensation would advance religion. Id. at 84. However, Justice
Brennan's aggregate view may be more defensible from an economic standpoint. Id. at 85-86.
Looking at the unemployment compensation scheme as a whole, one might attempt to segregate
religious believers into a separate risk pool because believers might have an extra reason for
being unemployed. Id. at 85.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), could be seen as an attempt by the Amish to
create a separate risk pool which was rejected by the Court. See supra note 104. For an
economic criticism of Lee, see Epstein, supra note 104, at 87-89. But in the absence of hard
data, it is impossible to say whether religious believers as a class have a higher or lower
incidence of unemployment. Id. at 85. The evidence before the Sherbert Court indicated that
only two Seventh-day Adventists in the town were unable to find jobs which did not require
Saturday work. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399 n.2. Moreover, it may prove quite difficult for the
state to actually segregate believers into a separate risk pool. Epstein, supra note 104, at 85.
Consequently, if the Court were to accord much weight to Mrs. Sherbert's dilemma, an
exemption was required. Id.
308. But see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
309. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515-18 (1937).
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similar exemption to other sects when necessary. °10 Moreover, the state had
not afforded religious believers the opportunity to obtain unemployment
insurance that would compensate religiously motivated unemployment.
Furthermore, the settlement costs are likely to exceed the common gains
of the scheme. Given the evidence that Sherbert-esque situations are not
common, the state probably would have been better off settling the claim,
rather than engaging in extensive litigation.3 '
b. Is the specific exclusion from a government program valid?
This category of cases includes Widmar v. Vincent.31 2 One is tempted to
simply state that this class of cases is generally pursued under free speech
analysis, and thus "is sadly beyond the scope of this Comment." Neverthe-
less, Widmar and similar cases" 3 regarding access to school facilities are so
commonly associated with free exercise jurisprudence that consideration of
this category under this Comment's model is warranted.314
First, a court would be required to examine the efficiency of a policy such
as the one in Widmar. Here the answer is relatively easy to obtain. The
increased administrative costs of excluding groups, which amounts to dis-
crimination against certain groups, would probably render the policy inef-
ficient and invalid from an economic standpoint.
Even if the policy were efficient, the risk of systematic exploitation as-
sociated with a discriminatory policy would be high, raising demoralization
costs to an intolerable level. Moreover, even if a court were to accept the
argument that the university would incur costs by allowing access to religious
groups regardless of the policy's validity, the amount of satellite litigation
surrounding the access of religious groups to public fora tends to indicate
that settlement costs might be high in any event.3"5
310. See supra note 95.
311. In particular, the employment context has generated settlement costs in the form of
satellite litigation of similar issues. E.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136 (1987) (involved person who converted after taking a job and was later discharged when
she refused to work on her Sabbath). Hobbie is distinguishable from Sherbert insofar as the
probability of conversion is probably impossible to calculate, which means that there is probably
no ex ante redistribution of funds. At least there would be no redistribution among the
nonreligious. There would be a shifting of funds between the nonreligious and the religious,
however, unless religious believers paid unemployment benefits out of their premiums or from
a segregated fund. Epstein, supra note 104 at 86.
312. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
313. See supra note 129.
314. Consideration of Widmar itself is particularly appropriate, given the references to
economic concerns in both the majority opinion and the dissent. Cf. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276
(majority does not question university's right to make judgments on "how best to allocate
scarce resources"); id. at 288-89 (White, J., dissenting) (university policy forcing students to
walk "about a block and a half away" is a permissible burden, analogizing to cheapest cost-
avoider argument, but not accounting for demoralization or settlement costs).
315. See supra note 129.
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Thus, like the establishment clause, the free exercise clause would be
somewhat altered under the economic model. Exemptions from governmental
burdens on religious belief and practice would be largely upheld, perhaps
even more so than recent Court decisions, so long as the claimant could
show an actual religious belief or practice. Also, government would still be
prohibited from excluding religious groups from public facilities via content-
based regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has presented an economic model of the religion clauses
of the first amendment. Admittedly, the Comment may raise many additional
questions outside of those for which an answer is attempted. An efficiency-
based analysis of the religion clauses would differ from the Lemon test,
both in terms of their concerns and their results. While both tests would
look at governmental purpose, this Comment's model would then look at
the symbolic links between government and religion engendered by state
action and the divisiveness that might result from those links. In terms of
results, this Comment's model would perhaps be: more lenient in allowing
aid to nonpublic schools; similar to the Court's analysis of tax exemptions;
more stringent in the context of governmental displays of religion; and
similar to the Court's results in related free speech cases. It is unlikely that
this model would ever be adopted by the judicial system.3 16 Nevertheless, the
Comment does present an alternative that would not place scholars of
constitutional law through the jurisprudential equivalent of the Straits of
Messina. Imagine that.
Karl Bade
316. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2933 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Just as the Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics . . . the Eighth Amendment does not incorporate
the views of the Law and Economics school.") (citation omitted).
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